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I.
INTRODUCTION
The right of American workers to form meaningful unions and to
engage in effective forms of protest and collective bargaining was won only
in the 1930s and only by tremendous political struggle in the face of
extraordinary resistance from employers and their allies in government.'
The chief product of this effort was one of the most important pieces of
legislation in the Twentieth Century, the National Labor Relations Act, or
Wagner Act, of 1935. The Wagner Act was by no means fundamentally
radical; it did not in any way portend the destruction of private property,
wage labor, or capitalism. At the same time, the Wagner Act was a
remarkably progressive legal document, consistent with a genuinely
reformist vision of labor relations. It could be read to support effective
rights to organize, strike, and compel collective bargaining, to sanction a
vibrant labor movement, and even to endorse a truly progressive regime of
"industrial democracy."' But the fact that such a reformist regime was
consistent with the Wagner Act did not make it the law in any practical
sense. As is true of all important statutes, the meaning of the Wagner Act
was from the outset quite contingent and would follow not simply from a
straightforward application of its text, or even its legislative history, but
from a wide-ranging struggle to hammer out its meaning.'
An important actor in the struggle to define the meaning of the Wagner
Act was the Supreme Court. As most legal scholars know, one of the Late
New Deal Court's defining deeds was to uphold the Act against
constitutional challenge.4 Less well known, however, is the fact that this
Court did much to define the substance of the Wagner Act. As Karl Klare
states, the Roosevelt Court of the late 1930s and early 1940s took up "the
task of plotting the contours of the nation's new labor law." As it carried
out this fundamentally political project, the Court "shap[ed] the ideological
and institutional architecture of the modem capitalist workplace."5
The Court managed to shape the meaning of the Wagner Act within the
first six years or so of the statute's enactment. In a handful of decisions,
some of them ostensibly in the interests of labor, the Court essentially
purged the Act of its more reformist tendencies.6 As scholars like Klare
1. On workers' struggle for labor rights in the 1930s and the resistance they encountered from
employers and the government, see generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER, 1933-41: THE TURBULENT YEARS (1969).
2. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 284-85 (1978).
3. Id.at266,291.
4. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5. Klare, supra note 2, at 291-92.
6. Id. at 297-99. For example, in the very case in which it upheld the Act's constitutionality, the
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argue, these decision limited labor's protections under the Act, endorsed a
traditional conception of private property and contract, affirmed a long-
established distribution of power and control in the American workplace,
and eventually influenced labor to trade activism for quietism, direct action
for litigation, and the radical unionism of the 1930s and early 1940s for the
"responsible," or "business" unionism that would characterize the rest of
the Twentieth Century and carry into the Twenty-First Century.
At the center of this process, as sociologist Holly McCammon
demonstrates, was the Court's erosion of the right to strike. With cases like
NLRB v. Fansteel, which held the sit-down strike illegal and unprotected,
and NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., which exposed strikers to
permanent replacement, the Court dramatically narrowed the legal
definition of acceptable strikes, limiting their frequency and militancy, and
reducing their overall effectiveness as a means of challenging employers'
sovereignty over the workplace.7 By this attack on the right to strike, the
nominally progressive Late New Deal Court helped to deny labor free resort
to tactics essential not only to mounting any meaningful challenge to
capital-and with this, the very prospect of labor radicalism-but also to
advancing the Act's basic agenda of collective bargaining.8
To be sure, as critics of the Court's role in this process recognize, other
factors have also been important in organized labor's long decline.
Frequently mentioned in this connection is the internal history of the post-
war labor movement, which has often been characterized by corrupt,
Court broadly affirmed a traditional doctrine of freedom of contract. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Elsewhere, it confirmed the prerogative of employers to permanently replace
so-called "economic strikers" and generally to resort freely to their economic advantages over workers
in labor disputes. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The Court declared the sit-
down strike illegal and unprotected by the Act. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240
(1939). It declared unprotected by the Act a strike undertaken during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement, where the strike could be characterized as an attempt to modify the agreement. NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). And in a particularly confused opinion, the Court limited the
authority of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to afford workers remedies under the Act.
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
7. Holly J. McCammon, Legal Limits on Labor Militancy: U.S. Labor Law and the Right to
Strike since the New Deal, 37 SOC. PROBS. 206 (1990). McCammon has marshaled statistical evidence
to support her notion that the labor law generally-including, but not limited to, the changes imposed by
the Late New Deal Court-has structured the dynamics of strikes and reduced their frequency and
effectiveness. Holly J. McCammon, From Repressive Intervention to Integrative Prevention: The U.S.
State's Legal Management of Labor Militancy, 1881-1978, 71 Soc. FORCES 569 (1993); Holly J.
McCammon, Disorganizing and Reorganizing Conflict: Outcomes of the State's Legal Regulation of the
Strike since the Wagner Act, 72 SOC. FORCES 1011 (1994).
8. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, 252-81 (1985); George
Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 187 (1994). See also Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to
Strike, 79 TEx. L. REV. 703 (2001); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1767 (2001).
278 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 25:2
conciliatory, and incompetent leadership,9 as well as deindustrialization, the
collapse of political liberalism, and other unfavorable changes in the
political and economic landscape.'" Legal phenomena besides the Court's
jurisprudence in the late 1930s and early 1940s are mentioned as well.
Some commentators have cautioned against overstating the reformist
tendencies of the Wagner Act itself." Others have stressed, rather
convincingly, that the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which dramatically
transformed the structure of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) as
well as the substantive law, no doubt did at least as much as the Late New
Deal Court to alter the meaning of the Wagner Act.'2 Still others have
pointed to the impact of court decisions from the mid-1940s onward in
rendering the labor law less favorable to labor.' 3 If nothing else, these
diverse accounts demonstrate quite reasonably that the role of the Late New
Deal Court in transforming the American labor movement should not be
taken as the only, or even the central, explanation for labor's decline. At
the same time, the argument that the Late New Deal Court played a very
important role alongside other factors in defining the substance of the labor
law and in contributing to labor's decline is compelling.
An immensely important, and as yet almost completely overlooked,
chapter in the Supreme Court's erosion of New Deal labor law involved the
law of mutiny and its bearing on a brief, peaceful, and seemingly well-
justified strike by a handful of Depression-era seamen aboard a nondescript
freighter called the City of Fort Worth. Although not a concern of many
contemporary labor lawyers and labor law scholars, and little discussed
either in the scholarly literature or teaching materials, the Court's resolution
9. See, e.g., PAUL BUHLE, TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: SAMUEL GOMPERS, GEORGE MEANY,
LANE KIRKLAND, AND THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN LABOR (1999). See also INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA: THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993).
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
(1987); JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY,
1947-1994 (1995) [hereinafter GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE].
11. See, e.g., Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "'Reflections on the Distinctive Character
of American Labor Laws", 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1. See also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Essay, How the
Wagner Act Came to Be: A Prospectus, 96 MICH. L, REV. 2201 (1998); George Feldman, Workplace
Power and Collective Activity: The Supervisory and Managerial Exclusions in Labor Law, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 525 (1995).
12. See, e.g., GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at ch. 1; Michael H. Leroy & John H.
Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injunction: National Emergency Strikes Under the Taft-Hartley Act and
the Moribund Right to Strike, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 63 (2001); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-
Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763 (1998); Steven E. Abraham, How the Taft-Harley Act Hindered
Unions, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (1994).
13. See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale L.J. 1509
(1981). See also THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?: TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN
IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK (1991).
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of this matter, in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 14 helped to define the
meaning of post-New Deal labor law and to shape the history of the
American labor movement.15
On the morning of July 18, 1938, just as the City of Fort Worth
prepared to embark from the Port of Houston bound for its home in
Philadelphia, thirteen crewmen, all members of the radical and militant
National Maritime Union (NMU), struck to protest their employer's unfair
labor practices: its refusal to recognize and bargain with their union. The
strikers remained aboard ship throughout and their refusal to work
successfully prevented the ship from sailing. But the strike was free of any
violence and did not entail any threat to the ship's safety or any interference
with its primary functions. Indeed, the whole affair was rather tame; by the
end of the day, the dispute was temporarily resolved and the ship was under
way. Although the ship had no further labor troubles of any kind during the
voyage, when the City of Fort Worth reached Philadelphia, the ship's
officers discharged five crewmen who had played an active role in the
strike. This, it seemed at the time, constituted another violation of the
Wagner Act and in the view of the union, the Board, and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, clearly warranted the standard remedies of reinstating
the fired strikers and awarding them back pay. But when the matter was
finally decided by the Supreme Court, the Court found against the Board
and the seamen.' 6  It held that a shipboard strike constituted an act of
mutiny, a felony under federal law, that the strike aboard the City of Fort
Worth was illegal and unprotected, and that the Board therefore could not
remedy the discharges by ordering that the seamen be reinstated and
provided back pay.17
14. 316 U.S. 51(1942).
15. Most recent references to Southern Steamship concern the important role it played in the
Hoffman Plastic Compounds decision. 585 U.S. 137 (2000). Even these references, though, are
uniformly brief and say little about the substance of Southern Steamship itself See, e.g., Michael J.
Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 500 (2004);
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, The New
Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L.Rev. 1,
9-10 (2003).
16. An important point about the term "seamen" should be made at the outset. Seamen is a term
of art, albeit one subject to somewhat varied definition. As I use the term here, it denotes shipboard
workers generally, but so-called "unlicensed" personnel in particular. Through the Great Depression,
this class of shipboard workers included members of the deck crew, including "deck boys," able-bodied
seamen, and boatswains; members of the engine department, including "trimmers," "oilers," "stokers,"
and engineers; and the catering crew, meaning mainly stewards and cooks. Not included are the so-
called "executive departments": the chief engineer; the chief steward; the mates; and the captain, or
"master." I avoid the term "sailor," as it usually denotes only those seamen who are part of a vessel's
deck crew. See JAMES C. HEALEY, Foc'S'LE AND GLORY-HOLE: A STUDY OF THE MERCHANT
SEAMEN AND His OCCUPATION 6-10, 18-38 (1936). As we shall see, the strike aboard the City of Fort
Worth involved unlicensed personnel, who were the mainstay of the NMU's membership.
17. S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 51 (1942).
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On one level, Southern Steamship is a case about the labor rights of
seamen. Unlike the great industrial sit-down strikes of the 1930s-with
which it was on legal grounds somewhat dubiously identified-the strike
aboard the City of Fort Worth was hardly an unusual event among seamen,
who, as this article shows, have always been among the most militant
workers in Western society. Nor was the Court's decision to prohibit the
shipboard strike, which left seamen no meaningful right to strike at all, in
the least bit unprecedented. As we shall see, the tradition of labor protest is
so pronounced among seamen that it is from their world that the very word
strike derives-as in "to strike" the sails.'" As this etymology implies, very
often such strikes took place aboard ship. In fact, in the months leading up
to the City of Fort Worth strike, the shipboard strike had proven decisive to
the belated rise of effective union representation among seamen-and to
labor's belated realization, in the face of employer resistance and
government ambivalence, of rights ostensibly guaranteed by the Wagner
Act. At the same time, the courts, which had long treated seamen in a
speciously paternalistic way, had also long called on mutiny law to prohibit
such strikes. By deeming the strike aboard the City of Fort Worth a mutiny,
the Southern Steamship Court not only affirmed a traditional function of
mutiny law (albeit on the basis of authority that had by the late 1930s
become very questionable) and the paternalistic view of seamen that
underlay this function. In addition to this, and against the view of the
Board and the Wagner Act's seemingly substantial expansion of labor
rights, the Court essentially deprived seamen of the right to strike and
affirmed their inferiority under the law.
On another level, Southern Steamship affected the meaning of the
Wagner Act for all workers. It accomplished this by advancing a multiple
part doctrine. First, the Court's decision broadly upheld traditional notions
of private property and contract against the Wagner Act's implication and
labor's demand that these rights of capital be compromised to accommodate
limited rights for labor. Southern Steamship, perhaps even more than
Fansteel, affirmed the position that strikes at the point of production or in
violation of certain contractual regimes would not be tolerated. Second,
Southern Steamship dramatically expanded Fansteel in another way. While
Fansteel rendered unprotected those strikes that were both unlawful and
featured manifest violence, Southern Steamship held that the mere
unlawfulness of a strike limited the Board's remedial powers and with this
the right to strike. The Court justified this rule by speculating widely as to
the inherent risks of mutiny. In so doing it established this kind of
speculation as a legitimate mode of analysis for courts to engage in to test
18. MARcus REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN,
PIRATES, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD, 1700-1750, at 205 (1987) [hereinafter
REDIKER].
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the limits of the Board's remedial powers and the reach of the Act's
protections. In fact, Southern Steamship established a clear rule to the
effect that the Board's remedial powers and the Act's protections should
yield wherever they came into conflict with other federal statutes or
policies. As we shall see, every aspect of this doctrinal approach has had
important practical consequences. This was most recently and ominously
on display in the Court's own 2002 decision, Hoffman Plastic Compounds
v. NLRB, where a majority of the Court relied on Southern Steamship to
effectively deny undocumented workers any rights under labor law.19
None of this, it is important to stress, was foreordained by the terms
and history of the Wagner Act, or by the facts of the case. In fact, as we
shall also see, the Court's reasoning is highly questionable with regard to its
interpretation of mutiny law, its view of the Wagner Act itself, as well as its
incorporation of the facts. It is for this reason that Southern Steamship
reveals so much about the Court's view of the proper relationship of labor
and capital-so much more than it does the meaning of the law. Indeed,
Southern Steamship forced the Court to lay bare its views on the respective
rights of labor and capital under the New Deal labor law. For, as I shall
argue, the modem ship evolved as a crucible of class conflict, including
shipboard strikes. And as it was practiced by Depression-era seamen, the
shipboard strike was an enormously powerful weapon. While it did not
displace the superiority of capital over labor, the shipboard strike did much
to reduce the huge disparity in power that characterized this relationship
aboard ship throughout the modem era. By resorting to the shipboard
strike, seamen of the 1930s were able to give real effect to labor law's
promises. At the same time that the shipboard strike was a tremendously
effective form of labor protest, it was also the only effective form of labor
protest available to seamen. The Court knew that to deny the legality of
shipboard strikes would leave seamen with no meaningful right of labor
protest at all. And yet it did just this. It is for these reasons that Southern
Steamship provides perhaps such a clear example of the Court's view of
labor rights as narrow and limited under the Wagner Act.
Of course to say the Court subverted the Wagner Act in these ways
should not be taken to imply that it conspired to do so, or was somehow
iron-bound by its members' class interests. Such scenarios are certainly
possible, given the American judiciary's persistent and well-documented
bias against the interests of labor.2" But these scenarios are not easy to
demonstrate. Nor are they necessary to explain a decision likely rooted
more in a genuine faith among the members of the Court in the traditional
19. 585 U.S. 137 (2002).
20. See generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991).
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virtues of private property and contract, as well as in the merits of industrial
order and the sanctity of the law itself. In the end, what the Court did to the
Wagner Act in Southern Steamship says at least as much about the Court's
jurisprudential framework and its overall political orientation as it does the
character or political affinities of the justices. 1
I organize this Article in the following way: Drawing on literature on
the social history of the maritime world, Part II considers broadly the
condition of labor aboard the modem merchant ship. I describe the modem
ship as a distinctly capitalist institution that emerged in the Eighteenth
Century and that, in its basic structures, remained unchanged through the
Nineteenth Century into the early Twentieth Century. The social and
material world of the modem ship emerges as a cauldron of class conflict
whose main structures remained very much in place aboard ships like the
City of Fort Worth in the 1930s. In Part III, I discuss the prominent role of
shipboard strikes in defining the world of shipboard labor and the
consistency with which this form of labor protest was prohibited by the law
of mutiny. In Part IV, I consider more narrowly the state of shipboard labor
relations as they existed in the three or four decades leading up to the
Southern Steamship mutiny. This Part emphasizes the slow rise of
effective, radical unionism. Parts V and VI are the analytical heart of the
Article. In Part V, I examine the strike itself and the history of the legal
controversy, from the trial examiner's decision to that of the Supreme
Court. Drawing in part on arguments raised by the parties themselves, I
show in this Part the poverty of the Court's reasoning and the ample
opportunities, which it ignored, to decide the matter differently. In Part VI,
I take up Southern Steamship's role in transforning New Deal labor law. I
do this by laying out both its jurisprudential connotations and its more
doctrinal implications-both for seamen and for workers in general. I also
try to situate the case within its historical context. Part VII is a relatively
brief conclusion in which I offer a postscript on the fate of the NMU and
seafaring labor. I also ask what effect a different outcome in Southern
Steamship might have had on that union, on shipboard labor relations, and
on the American labor movement generally.
II.
THE MODERN SHIP AS A CRUCIBLE OF CLASS CONFLICT
In the scheme of things, the strike aboard the City of Fort Worth on
July 18, 1938, was neither a random nor a particularly exceptional event. In
fact, the strike was in many ways the culmination of a long history of class
conflict aboard ships. The structure of the modem ship, which came to
21. Klare, supra note 2, at 269-70.
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embody perhaps more than any comparable institution, the contradictions of
labor in capitalist society, made such conflict inevitable. Indeed, the
structure of the ship not only portended the City of Fort Worth strike, but
also ensured that in passing on the legality of that strike, the Court would
have to confront head-on the limits of labor freedom under the Wagner Act.
It is for this reason, as well as the fact that it begins to reveal some of the
law's ingrained biases in this context, that a review of the class structure of
the modem ship provides a useful introduction to the Southern Steamship
affair.
The class structure of the modem ship was defined above all by the rise
of capitalism. Prior to capitalism's penetration of the maritime world in the
Seventeenth and early Eighteenth centuries, medieval shipboard life was
dominated by norms of paternalism, reciprocity, and stability. As in other
contexts, the rise of capitalism displaced these medieval norms with a
dynamic, profit-driven logic of commodification and accumulation. This
transformation was at its most salient with respect to labor relations. While
medieval norms often encouraged enduring and mutually supportive
relationships between a seaman and his captain, capitalism replaced this
with a system of anonymous and transitory contracts, mediated by money
wages, and largely devoid of any kind of security against loss or injury.2
As this transformation unfolded, the seaman's worth was radically recast in
terms of the relationship between the costs of maintaining him in wages and
accommodations, on the one hand, and the value of his work to a
commercially successful voyage, on the other. 3 A hard-driven crew and a
hard-driven ship, which would likely have constituted serious
transgressions of medieval workplace norms, now appeared as legitimate-
in fact, from the vantage of ship owners, desirable-methods to achieve a
more profitable voyage.24
22. I do not mean to idealize the condition of medieval shipboard labor, which was characterized
by its own kinds of unpleasantness: social immobility, material poverty, parochialism, and the like.
Rather, in drawing the contrast between the modem and the medieval, I mean to show the unique ways
in which the penetration of capitalism made the condition of shipboard labor not only unpleasant, but
unpleasant and immersed in class conflict. All the same, the cooperative moral economy of medieval
seafaring is clearly suggested in the French LAWS OF OLERON and the BARCELONA MARITIME CODE,
both of which emerged in the Thirteenth Century. They provided, among other things, for the captain to
submit important decisions to crew for approval, for the distribution of risks and gain between captain
and crew, for the captain to care for lost or injured seamen, and for mutual defense and support
generally.
23. With very few exceptions, the modem maritime world from its advent through the mid-
twentieth century was composed entirely of men. For this reason alone, I use male pronouns throughout
this article.
24. REDIKER, supra note 18, at 116-50. On the contradictory social structure of the modem ship
and its origins, see PETER LINEBAUGH & MARCUS REDIKER, THE MANY-HEADED HYDRA: SAILORS,
SLAVES, COMMONERS, AND THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ATLANTIC 149-53 (2000)
[hereinafter LINEBAUGH & REDIKER].
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The outstanding expression of the ship owner's organization of labor
as it emerged aboard the modem ship was its intense authoritarianism,
which on the modem ship evolved well beyond the inherent needs of
navigation and beyond tradition to entail the very different function of
better exploiting labor from the ship's crew. 5 With capitalism, the
structure of authority aboard ship became both more hierarchical and more
dictatorial. Indeed, the captain emerged as "master" of the vessel, his reign
governed by the law of profit. He became the absolute arbiter of the ship's
interests while away from home port, charged by the ship's owners (of
whom he was sometimes one) with managing the ship and its cargo and
advancing the owners' interests against all impediments-for example, poor
weather and sea conditions or competition from rivals.2 6 And he assumed a
near absolute right to control the ship's crew. It was the captain's near
complete prerogative to control the size of the ship's crew, the structure of
its workday, and the nature of individual assignments. Some captains
bowed to limitations imposed by custom or law, or more often to the threat
of labor unrest, and maintained more or less adequately sized crews,
reasonable work schedules, and perhaps even a bit of deference to the crew
itself in sorting out the ship's work. Many others, though, simply managed
the ship and its crew according to their own commercially driven
judgment.2 As a result of these changes, the ship became quite literally a
model of industrial organization.28
The captain's right to control the crew entailed a right to discipline it as
well. Indeed, for over two centuries of modem seafaring-from the
Eighteenth Century until about 1900-this prerogative was backed by a
notorious right to beat, threaten, or otherwise punish his crew almost at will.
Variously justified, both legally and morally, by patriarchal notions of the
captain as "father" to a childish crew,29 or by appeal to the practical virtues
of brutality in a dangerous realm,3" the captain's authority included the right
to inflict corporal punishment on any member of his crew. Even the
doctrines of "reasonable" and "proportionate" punishment, which
25. REDIKER, supra note 18, at 111-14, 207-12.
26. Id. at 84, 211-12.
27. JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG, THE MARITIME STORY 13-14 (1958).
28. In the words of Peter Linebaugh and Markus Rediker, leading social historians of the maritime
world, "the work, cooperation, and discipline of the ship made it a prototype of the factory."
LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, supra note 24, at 150.
29. See, e.g., Bangs v. Little, 2 F. Cas. 587 (D. Me. 1839) (No. 839); Wilson v. The Mary, 30 F.
Cas. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1828) (No. 17,823); Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 F. Cas. 666 (D. Pa. 1879) (No.
11,754); Fuller v. Colby, 9 F. Cas. 980, 985 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 5,149). The captain had a
reciprocal obligation to "protect" the crew, which was limited but not altogether meaningless. Shorey v.
Rennell, 22 F. Cas. I (D. Mass. 1858) (No. 12,806).
30. See, e.g., The Palledo, 18 F. Cas. 1013 (D. Me. 1865) (No. 10,677); Thompson v. Hermann, 3
N.W. 579 (Wis. 1879).
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Nineteenth Century American courts invoked ostensibly to place some
limits on the captain's power, often served perversely to justify abuses.3
As late as 1891, a federal court determined that breaking a broomstick over
a sailor's head for a relatively trivial act of insubordination was "not an
unusual means of punishment" for a captain to inflict.3 2  In fact, in the
American context, corporal punishment reached its most pervasive levels in
the several decades following the Civil War.33 Not until 1898 did the law
explicitly prohibit corporal punishment aboard merchant ships.34 Even after
this, courts continued to speak of "reasonable" beatings.35 Corporal
punishment likely did not fade from widespread use on American ships
until a decade or so into the Twentieth Century.36
It is just as important to note that corporal punishment was but the
most extreme of a number of methods of punishment that ship's captains
routinely visited on their crews. These included imprisoning seamen,
denying them rations, putting seamen "in irons," assigning them extra labor,
subjecting them to dangerous conditions (for example, ordering a sailor
aloft during a fierce storm), marooning them in distant ports, and refusing
31. On judicial conceptions of these doctrines, see, for example, United States v. Freeman, 25 F.
Cas. 1208, 1210 (C.C.D. Mass. 1827) (No. 1208); Brown v. Howard, 14 Johns. 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1817); Sampson v. Pease, 6 Haw. 2 (1867); The Lizzie Burrill, 115 F. 1015 (S.D. Ala. 1902). A number
of cases illustrate the courts' frequent resort to these doctrines to justify corporal punishment. For
example, when in one instance the captain randomly, but reasonably, beat up one of several crewmen for
responding too slowly to his orders, a federal court cited the master's need to compel immediate
obedience as grounds for him to draw on "all the force that is actually necessary to secure it, even to the
extent of striking blows." Stout v. Weedin, 95 F. 1001, 1002 (D. Wash. 1899). Similarly, it was
deemed reasonable for a riverboat captain to punch a female seamen (a chambermaid), break her nose,
and generally slap her around because she was "insolent and insubordinate," and possibly threatened the
captain with a lump of coal. Johns v. Brinker, 30 La. Ann. 241, 241 (La. 1878). Nor was it a basis for
damages for the captain of an arctic whaleship to put a seaman in irons with a stick under his knees and
over his arms, as this caused "no appreciable suffering." The Thrasher, 173 F. 258 (9th Cir. 1909).
32. Healey v. Cox, 45 F. 119, 119(D.S.C. 1891).
33. As late as 1895 the National Seaman's Union could compile, over a limited time and space,
dozens of cases of serious beatings and other truly brutal acts, and fourteen murders, committed by
captains and their officers on seamen. NAT'L SEAMEN'S UNION OF AM., THE RED RECORD: A BRIEF
RESUME OF SOME OF THE CRUELTIES PERPETRATED UPON AMERICAN SEAMEN AT THE PRESENT TIME
(San Francisco 1895). This report not only excludes routine acts of violence; it covered only seven
years and was limited to incidents aboard ships sailing from West Coast ports (mostly San Francisco)
and engaged in domestic, as opposed to foreign, trade.
34. Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28, § 22, 30 Stat. 761-62. A half-century earlier, in 1850, Congress
enacted a statute banning "flogging" aboard any naval or merchant vessel. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 80,
9 Stat. 515. But this was quickly construed to prohibit only one very particular kind of abuse: use of the
cat-o'-nine-tails. See, e.g., Dorrell v. Schwerman, Ill F. 209 (E.D. Wis. 1901); Charge to Grand Jury,
30 F. Cas. 981, 983 (C.C.R.I. 1853) (No. 18249). In all, according to a scholar who has studied mutinies
from 1820 to 1920, the 1850 statute made "little difference," even in the frequency with which the cat-
o'-nine-tails was used. Briton C. Busch, "Brace and be Dam'd: " Work Stoppages on American
Whaleships, 1820-1920,3 INT'L J. OF MAR. HIST. 95, 103 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Dorrell, 111 F. at 210. See also City of Mobile, 116 F. 212 (S.D. Ala. 1902).
36. BRUCE NELSON, WORKERS ON THE WATERFRONT: SEAMEN, LONGSHOREMEN, AND UNIONISM
IN THE 1930s 14 (1990).
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to pay their earned wages. Lacking corporal punishment's sensational
features, these methods were objects of labor protests and, eventually,
organizing efforts, which were frequently unsuccessful. But they seldom
generated public anger, official outcry, or legal action and remained
commonplace well into the New Deal era.37
The most important point that can be made about the abusive discipline
aboard the modem ship is that, like the ship's authoritarianism generally, it
reflected a "rational" economic agenda. It was not "for his own pleasure,"
as one outraged Nineteenth Century writer put it, that the captain "beats and
starves and maltreats his crew." Rather, "it is his business" to do so. 8
Discipline was meant to wrest as much work as possible from as small a
crew as possible and for the least possible compensation. While a few
captains surely were pathologically sadistic, and while a few others no
doubt overreacted to some genuine threat to the ship or some other peril of
navigation, profit was the usual motive behind beating, threatening, and
otherwise relentlessly hounding the crew.39
Although the authoritarianism of the modem ship was not mandated by
the technical and physical conditions unique to seafaring, this state of
affairs was in practice much exacerbated by these conditions. In some
respects modem seamen were prototypical examples of capitalist "free
labor"-they were after all money wage earners, hired for discrete periods
of time, who entered their positions by contract. But in other respects they
remained rather serf-like, tied to the ship and its authoritarian regime. This
dual role followed from both the law and the practical realities of shipboard
37. See, e.g., Busch, supra note 34, at 102 tbl.3.
38. Charles Nordhoff, The Rights and Wrongs of Seamen, 48 HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG.
556, 558 (1874).
39. Some authorities, the popular maritime historian Samuel Eliot Morrison among them, have
suggested that the pervasiveness of these punishments and the overall authoritarianism that prevailed
aboard the modem ship flowed naturally out of the nature of seafaring. See, e.g., SAMUEL ELIOT
MORRISON, THE MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1783-1860 (1961), at 24. See also JUDITH
FINGARD, JACK IN PORT: SAILORTOWNS OF EASTERN CANADA (1982), at ch. 2, pp. 46-81. Although
perhaps intuitively attractive and consistent in a perverse way with literary images of the ship as theatre
of timeless dramas-a superficial reading of Herman Melville, Jack London, or Joseph Conrad comes to
mind-it seems that this more traditional view is quite wrong. An important suggestion that the ship
could be managed in a more humane way emerges, of all places, from the history of the pirate ship.
Unlike their popular image as dens of cruelty and avarice, the pirate ship evolved in the Eighteenth
Century first and foremost as a way for seamen to strike back at the awful conditions they experienced
aboard merchant and naval ships. More surprisingly, the pirate ship was-to again quote Linebaugh and
Rediker-"democratic in an undemocratic age," "egalitarian in a hierarchical age," and surprisingly
diverse, both ethnically and by sex. For the pirates themselves, plunder and mayhem were neither
simple acts of greed or expressions of violence, but ways of "taking revenge against merchant captains
who tyrannized the common seaman and against royal officials who upheld their prerogative to do so."
With this agenda, pirates proved that neither the sea itself nor the technology of the ship necessitated the
deep authoritarianism of the modem ship, nor its total commitment to the project of accumulating
capital. LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, supra note 24, at 162-67. See also REDIKER, supra note 18, at 254-
87.
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service. Once at sea or in a distant port, seamen were for the most part
quite unable to escape the ship's service or the captain's jurisdiction. There
were, of course, few places to hide for very long aboard a ship, even a large
one. It was likewise very difficult and dangerous to flee the ship once it
was at sea. This could be done, but it entailed a number of very risky steps:
first, stealing a ship's boat or pirating the ship itself, second, successfully
reaching a safe harbor; and third, evading prosecution for the crimes
necessarily committed to get this far. Simply deserting the ship in port
avoided these risks, but came with its own hazards. As a condition of
employment seamen were long required to execute "shipping articles" by
which, among other things, they obligated themselves not to desert. A
seaman who deserted notwithstanding this agreement legally forfeited his
wages and his personal property and, through much of the Nineteenth and
early Twentieth centuries, also faced criminal prosecution." Besides this, a
deserting seaman, finding himself in a strange place, could very easily end
up "impressed" or "shanghaied" into the service of another, perhaps more
authoritarian merchant ship or naval vessel.4" And if he deserted in a
foreign port he could find himself simply unable to get home-perhaps
even forced to work his way home on another ship for no pay.
The nature of shipboard service exacerbated the ship's authoritarianism
in another way. Seafaring has always been an extremely dangerous calling.
A sailor could easily be swept way and drowned, dashed against the ship,
crushed by machinery-he could be killed or maimed in any number of
ways. And of course even a staunch, well-handled ship could founder,
likely killing everyone on board. These risks surely made the life of the
seaman all the more unpleasant.42 Worse for him they also, as we have just
seen, provided both ship's captains and the courts with an appealing, if
ultimately dubious, manner of rationalizing the ship's authoritarianism.43
40. See HEALEY, supra note 16, at 14-15. Criminal liability for desertion was established
primarily under the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, §§ 51-53, 17 Stat. 262, 273-75.
41. In American ports, this was a particular risk in the early Twentieth Century. See, e.g., Lance
S. Davidson, Shanghaied! The Systematic Kidnapping of Sailors in Early San Francisco, 64 CAL. HIST.
10(1985).
42. For an empirical review of the extensive hazards of shipboard service in the early Twentieth
Century, see, for example, HEALEY, supra note 16, at 103-16.
43. Such a defense of shipboard authoritarianism in fact suffers from several limitations. The first
is that modem seamen often knew as much about sailing the ship as their captain and his officers.
REDIKER, supra note 18, at 94-96. The second problem with this reasoning is its assumption that a crew
would recklessly compound the risks to themselves in a storm, for example, simply to challenge the
captain's rule. As Rediker points out, the axiom that "everyone is in the same boat" was quite true,
albeit in two very different senses. The modem ship featured both a corporate and a class
"collectivism," the former representing the investment of all sailors, officers, and seamen in the fate of
the ship and the voyage, the latter representing each side's class interests as against the other. Id. at 83-
115. Of course, the captain might be the best person to pilot the ship through a dangerous situation. But
just the same, he might not. As we shall see, many instances of "mutiny" were nothing more than the
crew banding together to save themselves from the captain's incompetence. In this light, the law's hard
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The penetration of capitalism, also accounted for incredibly poor
accommodations that prevailed aboard most ships. Money or space that
might have been expended on the crew's accommodations was better
invested in cargo or labor, or in the ship itself. The same logic applied to
allowing the crew time to tend to their own needs (for example, by cooking,
cleaning, or sewing) when this might better go towards operating the ship.
Each of these dynamics created a powerful incentive for owners and
captains to consign their crews to the most austere accommodations. As a
result, right through the Great Depression, seamen's quarters on American
merchant ships were invariably dank, unventilated, and vermin-infested.
Food and bedding were poor, medical care was often virtually nonexistent,
and clothing ragged. Indeed, this stingy logic often compromised the
integrity of the ship itself; many vessels were intentionally operated in a
state of unseaworthiness simply to limit costs and maximize profits.'
The process by which the rise of capitalism replaced a system of
maritime labor dominated by medieval norms with one dominated by
capitalist norms was in most senses much more beneficial to capital than to
labor. And yet it is important to recognize that this process yielded not so
much a stable regime of class domination, as it did an unsettled regime of
class conflict. The modem ship should be seen as both an "engine of
capitalism" that embodied capitalism's normative structure and as a
primary "setting of resistance" to those very structures.4 5 Poor pay and
other deprivations, rigid hierarchy, the captain's dictatorial rule, physical
isolation, service on an unseaworthy vessel-each of these developments
conspired with the collective character of shipboard labor to engender a
tradition of class consciousness among seamen.
Of particular importance in converting the generalized resentment that
the ship's objective hardships generated among seamen into a real sense of
class consciousness was the unique quality of shipboard labor as both an
intensely hierarchical process, as between seamen and their officers, and a
uniquely cooperative undertaking, among the seamen themselves. Seamen
were not an entirely undifferentiated lot in terms of their respective skills,
rank, and influence. But in light of the tremendous gulf between
themselves as a group, and the captain and his officers (who, though simply
the captain's managers, wielded authority over the crew in his name), the
presumption that the captain was virtually always right-and that he could confirm his superior
seamanship by force-reveals more about the social norms of capitalism and the law's support for these
norms than it does the nature of seafaring.
44. On the physical conditions of shipboard life in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century,
see, for example, Robert D. Foulke, Life in the Dying World of Sail, 1870-1910, 3 J. BRIT. STUD. 105
(1963); W. Clark Russell, The Life of the Merchant Sailor, 14 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 3 (1893); Nordhoff,
supra note 38, at 561-62.
45. LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, supra note 24, at 144.
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seamen could hardly help but recognize themselves as a distinct class-one
particularly burdened by the many adversities of shipboard service. This
inspired the seamen themselves to disavow paternalistic medieval norms-
which had bound them, too, to quiescent service-in favor of a genuine
sense of class identity. Furthering this sense of class identity was the
architecture of the ship, which from the dawn of modem seafaring right
through the Depression physically segregated seamen from the captain and
his officers. Seamen ate, slept, and fraternized in a space, the "fo'castle,"
completely separate from their superiors. Even ashore, they tended to hold
themselves apart from other workers, and from ships' officers, in their own
"sailortowns." In their separate domain seamen not only felt a sense of
class identity in some passive way; they also actively cultivated this
identity, through rituals and games and talk.46
In this context the ship's authoritarian structure remained unstable and
the captain's own authority quite tenuous. Class identity and class conflict
became class resistance. Many ships-in fact probably most-were scenes
of continual, low-level skirmishing between captain and crew involving as
much in the way of threats and intrigue as actual, overt combat between
sides. 7 On many other ships, though, resistance took more overt forms.
Throughout the modem era of seafaring, seamen fought their captain or his
officers, or they sabotaged the ship's gear. On some occasions (rare after
the Eighteenth Century) they even resorted to outright piracy, an institution
that evolved as much out of maritime class conflict as it did greed or simple
criminality.48 In other cases, some contingent of the crew-usually only
one or two men-simply deserted the ship, walking away in the hope that a
better ship, with better accommodations, easier work, or a better captain,
might be found.49 But most importantly, seamen resorted to forms of
collective protest-or as the law long saw it, they mutinied.
III.
MUTINY AND LABOR PROTEST
"There is no justice or injustice on board ship, my lad. There are only
two things: duty and mutiny-mind that. All that you are ordered to do is
46. Margaret S. Creighton, Fraternity in the American Forecastle, 1830-1870, 58 NEW ENG. Q.
531 (1990).
47. This dynamic is clearly illustrated in the some of the most famous fictional literature on
shipboard life, especially the works of C.H. Dana, Herman Melville, Joseph Conrad, and Jack London.
48. On the class dimensions of piracy, see LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, supra note 24, at 162-67;
REDIKER, supra note 18, at 254-87.
49. See, e.g., The Lola, 15 F. Cas. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1872) (No. 8468). In some cases, a crew might
be involuntarily "deserted" by a captain seeking to replace them with cheaper labor in a port featuring a
labor surplus. See, e.g., The William Cummings, 29 F. Cas. 1293 (E.D. Penn. 1870) (No. 17,690).
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duty. All that you refuse to do is mutiny. '50 So the advice of a Nineteenth
Century Swedish sailor captured mutiny's dual nature as the practice of
shipboard labor protest and the legal cornerstone of labor repression aboard
ship. For most of American history any shipboard strike or work stoppage
involving more than a couple of sailors was almost certain to be declared a
mutiny by the ship's captain and its owners as well as by the courts. But as
is so often the case where the law's class biases are insufficiently concealed
by ideology and where the police and courts are not literally at hand, what
the law of mutiny dictated and what seamen did were often very different
things. And so for much of American history seamen simply resorted to
shipboard strikes in violation of the law.
A. Mutiny as Criminal Law
The power to enact mutiny laws rests with the Congress." Reflecting
their common concern with labor protest and other challenges to maritime
authority, the mutiny laws were initially embedded in laws aimed at
punishing piracy. 2 This was true of this country's first mutiny statute,
which was enacted as a provision of the Crimes Act of 1790 alongside more
extensive provisions on piracy. The statute held that "if any seamen..
shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken
and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall
suffer death."53 Elsewhere, the statute also provided that "if any seaman
shall confine the master of any ship or other vessel, or endeavor to make a
revolt in such ship" he would, upon conviction, "be imprisoned not
exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars. '54 In
1835, following a general trend towards statutory refinement, the mutiny
statute was redrafted. In lieu of the 1790 statute's perfunctory definition of
the completed crime of mutiny, the new statute provided,
That if any one or more of the crew of any American ship or vessel on the
high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States, shall unlawfully, willfully, and with force,
or by fraud, threats, or other intimidations, usurp the command of such ship
or vessel from the master or other lawful commanding officer thereof, or
deprive him of his authority and command on board thereof, or resist or
prevent him in the free and lawful exercise thereof, or transfer such
authority and command to any other person not lawfully entitled thereto,
50. REDIKER, supra note 18, at 211 (quoting KNUT WEIBUST, DEEP SEA SAILORS: A STUDY IN
MARITIME ETHNOLOGY 362 (1969)).
51. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
52. V. Henry Rothschild II, The Legal Implications of a Strike by Seamen, 45 YALE L. J. 1181,
1186-87 (1935-36).
53. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113-14.
54. § 12,1 Stat. at 115.
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each such person so offending, his aiders or abettors, shall be deemed guilty
of a revolt or mutiny and felony."
Moreover, the capital punishment provision which had applied to the
completed crime was removed altogether-apparently because its severity
discouraged convictions. 6 It was replaced by imprisonment at hard labor,
for up to ten years and a fine of up to $2,000, "according to the nature and
aggravation of the offence.
' 57
In lieu of the 1790 statute's pithy definition of inchoate mutiny, the
new statute inserted language that was not only broader in coverage and
more detailed, but that explicitly recognized a conspiracy charge. The 1835
statue made it a felony if "any one or more of the crew...
Shall endeavour to make a revolt or mutiny on board such ship or vessel, or
shall combine, conspire or confederate with any other person or persons on
board to make such revolt or mutiny, or shall solicit, incite or stir up any
other or others of the crew to disobey or resist the lawful orders of the
master, or other officer of such ship or vessel, or to refuse or neglect their
proper duty on board thereof, or to betray their proper trust therein, or shall
assemble with others in a tumultuous and mutinous manner, or make a riot
on board thereof, or shall unlawfully confine the master or other
commanding officer thereof.
58
For conviction of this felony, a sailor faced up to five years in prison
and a fine of up to $1,000. 59 Remarkably, this statutory regime, which is
what the Court invoked in Southern Steamship, remains in place today,
substantially unchanged from its 1835 form.6"
Although the mutiny statute has remained fundamentally unchanged, in
1872 Congress did significantly expand the law in a related area by passing
the Shipping Commissioners Act. This statute, which comprehensively
reformed much of maritime law, included a lengthy section on the
"discipline of seamen," which added alongside mutiny other lesser crimes
of shipboard insubordination. The simple act of "willful disobedience" of
"lawful commands" was made punishable by up to two months
imprisonment and forfeiture of up to four days pay. "Continued willful
disobedience to lawful commands, or continued willful neglect of duty"
could be punished by six months imprisonment as well as forfeiture of up to
twelve days' wages. Assault on the master or a mate could be punished by
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1835, ch. 40, § 1,4 Stat. 775, 775-76.
56. See, e.g., Gales & Seaton's Register, Feb. 19, 1835, pp. 535-36.
57. Act of Mar. 3, 1835, ch. 40, § 1,4 Stat. 775, 775.
58. § 2,4 Stat. at 776.
59. Id.
60. See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2192, 2193 (2002). Minor amendments were made to these provisions in
1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 292-93, 35 Stat. 1088, 1146 (1909), and 1948, Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 103, §§ 2192-93, 62 Stat. 800, 800 (1948).
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up to two years imprisonment. And "combining with any other" to disobey
commands or neglect duty or otherwise interfere with the operation of the
ship could result in a year in prison.6' An 1898 statute, the White Act,
halved the prison sentences for willful disobedience and for continued
willful disobedience and removed the "combining with others" language;
but the new statute also granted the captain the authority to punish the
remaining offences at sea by placing the offender "in irons" and, in case of
continued disobedience, putting him on a diet of "bread and water."6 So
amended, these lesser crimes and analogous punishments are still part of the
federal law today.63
Other sections of the 1872 statute were dedicated to protecting seamen
from a number of abuses prevalent in the post-bellum context. The statute
sought, in part by installing a number of United States Shipping
Commissioners who would enforce these standards, to remedy such things
as inadequate provisioning of vessels, inadequate clothing and
accommodations, predatory contracting, exploitative practices of
unscrupulous "sailor town" labor agents, or "crimps," and abandonment of
seamen after shipwreck or other disaster.6'
By enacting these protections, the Congress expanded on a
paternalistic theme that has always characterized maritime labor law:
marrying punitive measures that restrict labor freedom to other provisions
that ostensibly protect or benefit labor. Not unlike the Congress that passed
the Shipping Commissioners Act, the First Congress-the one that
prescribed the death penalty for mutiny-also enacted protective legislation
giving seamen the right to written employment contracts, access to a
"medicine chest," the right to a portion of their wages during the voyage,
protection from onboard debt collection, and a limited right to demand a
survey of a ship thought to be unseaworthy.65 Other Congresses, and on
occasion the courts, expanded these protections numerous times in the
Nineteenth Century.66 This protective impulse culminated-at least as a
61. Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, § 51, 17 Stat. 262, 273-74.
62. Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28, § 19, 30 Stat. 755, 760-61.
63. Today, instead of being placed in irons for willful disobedience, the seaman, "at the discretion
of the master may be confined until the disobedience ends." 46 U.S.C.S. § 11501(4) (2002). And, for
"continued willful disobedience," instead of a diet of bread and water, the seaman, "at the discretion of
the master, may be confined, on water and 1,000 calories, with full rations every 5th day, until the
disobedience ends." § 11501(5).
64. Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, §§ 1-50, 61-68, 17 Stat. 262-273, 276-77.
65. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 1-3, 6, 8-9, 1 Stat. 131, 131-35.
66. For example, the 1835 mutiny statute went so far as to impose up to five years imprisonment
and a $1,000 fine for corporal punishment or imprisonment of a seamen by an officer if such punishment
were unjustifiable and malicious or otherwise motivated by hatred or revenge. Act of Mar. 3, 1835, ch.
40, 4, § 3, Stat. 775, 776-77. Following this pattern, an 1840 statute that dramatically expanded the
duties of United States Consuls to require them to "reclaim deserters and discountenance
insubordination by every means within their power" also obliged them to "inquire into the facts" and
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matter of formal law, if not actual practices-in the 1910s, when agitation
by organized labor and the work of their supporters in Congress resulted in
the enactment of the LaFolette Seamen's Act of 1915.67 With this statute
maritime labor law evolved into an elaborate system that regulated working
hours, living accommodations, clothing, safety equipment, and security in
cases of illness and injury. In fact, by the 1930s, seamen were, as a formal
matter, the most extensively protected workers in America.68
The overall merits of legal paternalism aside, it would yet constitute a
grave mistake to equate the existence of these formal protections with a
system that actually protected the wellbeing of seafaring labor. It is in this
sense that the paternalism of modern shipboard labor relations was actually
rather fraudulent. We have already seen how ineffective anti-corporal
punishment laws could be. So ineffective, in fact, were all these protective
statutes that they helped to inspire among seamen an enduring skepticism
about the value of law and legal process-an attitude that would frame the
labor politics of the 1930s.69 As we shall also see, seamen in the 1930s still
labored under horrendous conditions that the law had done little to change.
While statutes like the Lafollette Act had some potential to protect seamen
in fairly meaningful ways, they initially did little more than obscure and
rationalize the true condition of shipboard labor.7"
determine whether the desertion was caused by "unusual or cruel treatment." Act of July 20, 1840, ch.
48, §§ 11, 17, 5 Stat. 394, 395-97. Other statutes of this kind made it a crime for the captain
maliciously to abandon a seaman in a foreign port, Act of Mar. 3, 1835, ch. 65, § 10, 4 Stat. 115, 117;
for any person to shanghai a seaman-to force him into service by force, threats, fraud, or intoxication.
Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3583, 34 Star. 551. The captain was obliged to protect the crew from other
officers. Dorrell v. Schwerman, Ill F.Cas. 209 (E.D.Wis. 1901); United States v. Harriman, 26 F. Cas.
172 (E.D.Va. 1876) (No. 15,311); The General Rucker, 35 F. 152, 158 (W.D.Tenn. 1888). And the
captain was supposed to be responsible for seamen imprisoned in foreign ports. Shorey v. Rennell, 22
F.Cas. 1, 5-6 (D.C.Mass. 1858) (No. 12,806).
67. LaFollette Seamen's Act of 1915, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915).
68. For a summary of the many legal protections seamen nominally enjoyed by the mid 1930s,
see, for example, Rothschild, supra note 52, at 1181-84.
69. Citing the RED REcORD, which is replete with stories of un-remedied abuse, historian of
maritime labor Bruce Nelson notes how this official indifference lead to an enduring cynicism about the
law. NELSON, supra note 36, at 13-14.
70. The Court's hand in this system of malign paternalism is perhaps most clearly evident in the
Supreme Court's notorious 1897 decision, Robertson v. Baldwin. There, the Court ruled seven-to--one
that the Shipping Commissioner's Act's criminalization of desertion, which also provided for seamen to
be forcibly returned to their vessels, did not offend the Thirteenth Amendment. The majority based this
decision squarely on the paternalistic view that such punitive measures were justified by the "very
careful provisions.., made for the protection of seamen against the frauds and cruelty of masters, the
devices of boarding-house keepers, and, as far as possible, against the consequences of their own
ignorance and improvidence." Seaman are properly treated this way by the Congress, the Court
continued, because they are "deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is
accredited to ordinary adults, and [need] the protection of the law in the same sense in which minors and
wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and guardians." Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275, 287 (1897). It took almost two decades and the passage of the LaFollette Seaman's Act for
Congress to fully overturn this decision.
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Any doubt, though, that the regime of mutiny law that first emerged in
1790 would be called on to punish shipboard strikers was resolved even
before the 1835 statute was enacted. Early courts were forced to confront
the 1790 statute's considerable ambiguity with regard to the basic meaning
of the concepts, "revolt" and "mutiny" (which are synonymous terms).
7 1 Of
course, all mutiny statutes proscribe overt, unjustified efforts to seize the
ship or displace the captain. This basic agenda, which is hardly
controversial, is described in a United States v. Kelley, an 1826 Supreme
Court decision clarifying some of the ambiguities of the 1790 statute.
Revolt, the Court determined,
consists in the endeavor of the crew of a vessel, or any one or more of them,
to overthrow the legitimate authority of her commander, with intent to
remove him from his command, or against his will to take possession of the
vessel by assuming the government and navigation of her, or by transferring
their obedience from the lawful commander to some other person.72
The much more important question-the one that would arise in
Southern Steamship-was whether mutiny law proscribed not only taking
the ship or actually displacing the captain, but also a simple refusal among
the crew to carry out the captain's orders. For if this fell within the
meaning of mutiny, all that the captain needed to do in order to convert any
shipboard strike into a serious felony was to order the crew to resume their
duties. An answer to this question was supplied by none other than soon-
to-be Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story. In the course of authoring
several opinions on the matter, Story made clear that such a refusal to
follow the captain's orders would indeed constitute mutiny. He declared
that,
[a]n endeavor to commit a revolt may be complete, not merely by stirring
up, encouraging, or combining with others of the ship's crew to produce a
general disobedience of all order; but also by stirring up, encouraging, or
combining with any one or more of the crew to produce a deliberate
disobedience to any one lawful order of the master or other officers.73
Story elsewhere made clear that the 1790 statute encompassed
conspiracy liability, including a circumstance where the crew conspired "to
refuse to do any further duty on board, and to disobey any further orders of
the master, with a view to compel him to yield up the command of the ship,
or to grant them any allowance inconsistent with his duty as master.
74
This expansive interpretation was not in any way mandated by the
71. MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 10:13 (4th ed. 1985).
72. United States v. Kelly, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 417,417-18 (1826) (Washington, J.).
73. United States v. Thompson, 28 F. Cas. 102, 103 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832) (No. 16,492) (emphasis
added).
74. United States v. Hemmer, 26 F. Cas. 259, 260 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 15,345) (emphasis
added). See also United States v. Haines 26 F. Cas. 62, 64 (C.C. D. Mass. 1829) (No. 15,275).
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literal terms of the 1790 statute. Indeed, the most important Supreme Court
decision of the day, the Kelly case mentioned above, could be read to
contemplate a much more restrictive view of the matter.75  Nonetheless,
Story's interpretation of mutiny law emerged as a majority rule and was
soon reflected, apparently, in the 1835 statute. While the statute's origins
are not entirely clear, for Story, the new text affirmed the interpretation he
had given the earlier statute.76 Story's view of mutiny became the dominant
conception in American courts through the Nineteenth Century, into the
early Twentieth Century. For example, in 1857, in United States v. Borden,
the federal district court for Massachusetts, confronting a work stoppage
aboard a whaleship, held that a "command to continue the business of
whaling is prima facie a lawful command, and if the prisoners at the bar, by
their united refusal to obey such command, prevented the master from
carrying on that lawful business, they prevented him in the free and lawful
exercise of his authority."77 While this court was careful to point out that
the mere fact that the workers had created a "combination" would not alone
constitute mutiny, such a combination would constitute mutiny if directed at
preventing the captain conducting the ship's business as he sawfit.7" Much
later, in Hamilton et al. v. United States, a 1920 case involving a mass
refusal to continue service on an apparently unseaworthy vessel, the Fourth
Circuit explicitly embraced Story's interpretation over the narrower one
contemplated by the Supreme Court in Kelly.79 Following Story's earlier
construction, the court in Hamilton ascribed no significance to the fact that
the striking seamen, whose behavior was entirely non-violent, made no
effort at all to take control of the ship, which was then in a foreign harbor,
or to interfere with the non-striking crew members.8 °
As a result of these constructions, any seamen who collectively refused
the captain's orders were subject to conviction of mutiny. It did not matter
that they conducted themselves peacefully. It did not matter that they did
not intend to displace the captain. And it did not matter that they had no
desire to seize the ship or determine its course. Indeed, even if the seamen
had no specific intent at all, beyond refusing the captain's orders, they
could still be found guilty of mutiny."1 Whether this regime would survive
the Wagner Act and the demands for greater labor freedom raised by New
75. Kelly, 24 U.S. at 417.
76. United States v. Cassedy, 25 F. Cas. 321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 14,745) (Story, J.). The
legislative history of the 1835 statute is very sketchy, to say the least, and says nothing of its primary
goals.
77. United States v. Borden, 24 F. Cas. 1202, 1203 (D.C.D. Mass. 1857) (No. 14,625).
78. Id. See also United States v. Lynch, 26 F. Cas. 1033 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 15,648).
79. Hamilton v. United States, 268 F. 15, 19 (4th Cir. 1920).
80. Id. at 18-20.
81. See, e.g., Thompson v. The Stacey Clarke, 54 F. 533 (S.D. Ala. 1892); United States v. Nye 27
F. Cas. 210 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 15,906).
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Deal labor remained very much to be seen.
B. Labor Protest as Mutiny
By the beginning of the Twentieth Century, only a handful of
exceptions, none of them particularly significant, restricted mutiny law's
prohibition of concerted labor protests by the crew.82  Not only
substantively weak, these defenses could only be raised in court, usually
many months and hundreds of miles from the point were the decision to
mutiny was made in the first place. But the same was also true, to the
captain's or owner's detriment, of the prospect of quickly or successfully
prosecuting the mutineers. The law, to invoke Starbuck of Melville's Moby
Dick, could well be "two oceans and a whole continent away."83 No doubt
because of this difficulty of effective and prompt enforcement as much as
the awful conditions aboard ship, sailors throughout the modem era
frequently defied both the law and the captain's extraordinary authority
(which was at its strongest in the right to put down mutinies) 84 to strike
aboard ship.
The typical mutiny was not, as some uncritical authorities persist in
suggesting, some wild and sensational act by a gang of common criminals
bent on violence, mayhem, or a gratuitous challenge to authority."
82. Notwithstanding the more expansive definition of mutiny offered in cases like United States v.
Thompson, an act of disobedience involving only one or two seamen was not likely to be construed as
mutiny unless it went beyond simply refusing the captain's orders. See, e.g., United States v. Huff, 13 F.
630 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1882); United States v. Forbes, 25 F. Cas. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1845) (No. 15,129).
Seamen could also raise the contractual defense that they are not obliged to sail the ship to a place not
described in the terms of their shipping articles, though in doing so they had to show that the deviation
was not justified by exigent circumstances. For example, the crew could defend themselves against a
mutiny charge if the orders disobeyed involved sailing the ship to a destination not named in the articles.
See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 26 F. Cas. 1207 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 15,742). Likewise, the
crew could avoid conviction if they were able to show that their disobedience was an effort to avoid
sailing on an unseaworthy ship, although to succeed seamen were eventually required by the courts to
overcome a strong presumption of seaworthiness. The ship involved in Hamilton, for example, had
serious difficulties with its boiler and had lost three propellers in the course of only four days. But this
would not overcome the presumption that it is for the captain to decide whether the vessel is ready for
sea. Hamilton, 268 F. at 21-22. See also United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874 (C.C.D. Mass.
1834) (No. 14,470). Cf United States v. Givings, 25 F. Cas. 1331, 1332 (D.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No.
15,212), where the court held that a reasonable belief that the vessel was unseaworthy would constitute
an effective defense even if the jury inclined to think differently. Finally, the captain's incompetence or
abusiveness might also be raised as a defense, but again subject to a substantial burden of proof See,
e.g., United States v. Cassedy, 25 F. Cas. 321, 322 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 14,745); The Ulysses, 24
F. Cas. 515, 518 (C.C.D. Mass 1800) (No. 14,330).
83. Says Starbuck, "I stand alone here upon an open sea, with two oceans and a whole continent
between me and law .. " MOBY DICK: AN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT 422 (Norton 1967).
84. United States v. Lunt, 26 F. Cas. 1021 (D. Mass. 1855) (No. 15,642) (captain authorized to
used deadly force if necessary to avert mutiny).
85. See, e.g., LEONARD F. GUTTRIDGE, MUTINY: A HISTORY OF NAVAL INSURRECTION (1992);
EDMUND FULLER, MUTINY!: BEING ACCOUNTS OF INSURRECTIONS, FAMOUS AND INFAMOUS, ON LAND
AND SEA, FROM THE DAYS OF THE CAESARS TO MODERN TIMES (1953).
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According to maritime historian Marcus Rediker, this would not accurately
characterize most Anglo-American mutinies at any point in the modem
era. 6 It would certainly not characterize mutinies on American ships in the
Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. During this period mutinies were
seldom anything other than simple labor protests, usually devoid of any real
violence and with modest, rational, and usually just aims. Most were aimed
not at seizing the ship, displacing the captain, or anything of the sort, but at
obtaining immediate redress of specific grievances about work assignments,
discipline, the seaworthiness of the ship, adequacy of provisions or
compensation, and the like. In other words, mutinies were a way of
responding to the very features that made day-to-day service aboard the
modem ship so difficult in the first place. This characterization is amply
supported by the reported cases as well as the historical literature.
The most compelling of these authorities are historical studies based on
ships' logbooks, sailors' journals, or other documents. One such study was
conducted by W. Jeffrey Bolster, who analyzed shipboard journals and
logbooks from 1820 to 1920. Bolster determined that the vast majority of
mutinies in this period "involved nothing more threatening than a
discontented lot of men fed up with endless work, little sleep, and barely
edible provisions who mustered aft in a body and simply refused to work."87
He found that most mutinies were not only limited in their objectives, but
also brief in duration and, especially in the earlier part of the period he
studied, apt to end in failure and repressive punishment. Bolster cites
numerous instances aboard ship in which a hungry or overworked crew, or
one perhaps angered by disciplinary action against a fellow seamen or
concerned for the condition of the vessel, simply "mustered" and presented
demands in connection with a contingent offer to return to work. Seldom
did mutinous seamen attempt actually to take command of the ship or
displace the captain, and even more seldom did mutineers inflict much
injury on ship's officers.88
Bolster's conclusions correspond closely to those reached by Briton
Busch in his somewhat more recent and specialized study of New England
whaleship voyages over the same period. Busch examined 2828 journals
and logbooks from 1820 through 1920 and found that an amazing seven
percent of voyages featured a documented work stoppage or some other
concerted protest by at least three crewmen-a rate that remained roughly
constant throughout this period. 89 Busch found the vast majority of these
events to have had their origins in disputes about labor conditions, with
86. REDIKER, supra note 18 at 226-43.
87. W. JEFFERY BOLSTER, BLACK JACKS: AFRICAN AMERICAN SEAMEN IN THE AGE OF SAIL 14
(1997).
88. Id.
89. Busch, supra note 34, at 98-99 tbl. 1.
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skimpy shore leave policies, severe or unjustified disciplinary action, poor
provisions, onerous work assignments, and questions about the
seaworthiness of the vessel forming the most common discernable
reasons.90  Most mutinies-about two-thirds-failed to achieve their
objective and resulted instead in the punishment of some or all of the
mutineers.9 Being put in irons was by far the most common punishment
for mutiny on the voyages Busch studied, followed by flogging and
imprisonment ashore.92 Other notable findings by Busch are that, like the
strike aboard the City of Fort Worth, the vast majority of mutinies actually
occurred dockside, and, confirming Bolster, that most mutinies usually did
not result in any physical harm to ships' officers. 93
A few mutinies have inspired scholarly case studies. These tend to
focus on the best-documented mutinies, and therefore the most elaborate,
intriguing, or outrageous episodes. But in a number of instances they too
reveal the way persistently abusive labor conditions could eventually
inspire the crew to take drastic steps.94 A case in point is the 1866 mutiny
aboard the clipper ship, White Swallow, which is described in detail by
Robert Schwendinger. No sooner had the ship sailed than the crew was put
to the dangerous and unnecessary task of scraping the hull in heavy
weather. Their protests were met with beatings and a refusal to change the
work assignments. Eventually one man was swept away and drowned, his
death made certain by half-hearted efforts of the ship's officers to save him.
The beatings and dangerous work continued until, a number of days later,
another man was swept away. In this instance, no attempt whatsoever was
made to save him. At that point the White Swallow's crew organized
themselves and seized the vessel. Seeking to avoid unnecessary violence,
they threw all weapons and alcohol overboard and compelled the captain to
agree to terms including reasonable and safe work assignments and a
cessation of beatings. Although the ship was able to continue with no
90. Id. at 100-01 tbl.2.
91. Id. at 102 tbl.3.
92. Id.
93. d. at 99. In many respects both Bolster's and Busch's contentions are confirmed by Margaret
Creighton in her analysis of social and labor relations aboard Nineteenth Century merchant ships.
According to Creighton, mutinous protests and desertion were quite common on Nineteenth Century
vessels. Mutiny encompassed a spectrum of strategies, from slowdowns and "pretenses of
incompetence," to outright work-stoppages, to rare efforts to take over the ship. And like Bolster and
Busch, Creighton locates the typical causes of these episodes in overwork, excessive punishment,
arbitrary leave policies, and the like. Creighton, supra note 47, at 545-47.
94. See, e.g., Steven H. Park, "The Ship Without Liberty": Mutiny and the Clipper Contest, 55
AM. NEPTUNE 123 (1995); Jane Litten, Greenhand Hero or Mutineer? Mutiny Aboard the Whaleship
Meteor, 39 LOG OF THE MYSTIC SEAPORT 54 (1987); Jay M. Pawa, The Jefferson Borden Pirates and
Sam Gompers: Aftermath of a Mutiny, 27 AM. NEPTUNE 46, 51-53 (1967); Philip F. Purrington,
Anatomy of a Mutiny, 27 AM. NEPTUNE 98 (1967); Sheldon H. Harris, Mutiny on "Junior", 21 AM.
NEPTUNE 110 (1961).
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further drama, the crew was charged with mutiny and saved from prison
only by a sympathetic jury.95
Although they share the limitation of all appellate decisions as
historical sources, the reported judicial cases offer a very similar portrait of
mutiny. While very few involved any wholesale attempt to take the ship or
anything else so sensational, a great number of the cases (many of them
civil actions involving forfeiture of wages that are premised on mutiny's
criminal definition) arose from straightforward disputes about working
conditions. This is true of the early, formative cases in mutiny law. In two
cases central to Story's definition of mutiny, United States v. Hamilton and
United States v. Haines, the mutiny developed as a nonviolent protest
against sailing under an undesirable substitute captain.96 Another of Story's
important mutiny cases, United States v. Gardner, arose when the crew quit
work to protest the arrangement of the watches.97 In other ante-bellum
cases, mutiny charges were brought against seamen who ceased work to
protest undermanning or other occasions of unseaworthiness,98 deviation
from the planned voyage,99 and inadequacy of provisions.0 °
Similar reasons continued to motivate mutinies in the post-bellum
period. In 1867, for instance, the crew of the William Cummings, seeking
early discharge from service, "made a concerted effort" to accomplish this,
and "would have been successful, had not energetic measures of
suppression been adopted."' 0 ' The same year, the captain of the Laura
Madsen brought about a mutiny by deviating from the planned voyage.
0 2
In 1868, the crew of the Almatia, then at the port of San Francisco, was
refused breakfast at the customary time and ordered by their intoxicated
captain to perform the apparently "unnecessary" task of unfurling a sail. To
this they responded by refusing to work and eventually quitting the ship. 3
In 1890, the Shawnee had its windlass carried away by heavy seas;
anticipating a heavier workload as a consequence, the crew demanded
higher wages. When this was refused, they mutinied to compel the master
to meet their demand."0 A dispute over an order to work after normal hours
led the crew of the Topgallant to mutiny and eventually desert that ship in
95. Robert J. Schwendinger, The Temperate Mutiny, 12 AM. W. 12 (1975).
96. United States v. Haines, 26 F. Cas. 62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1829) (No. 15,275); United States v.
Hamilton, 26 F. Cas. 93 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 15291).
97. United States. v. Gardner, 25 F. Cas. 1258 (C.C.D. Mass. 1829) (No. 15,188).
98. United States v. Lynch, 26 F. Cas. 1033 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 15,648).
99. United States v. Crawford, 25 F. Cas. 692 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843)(No. 14,890).
100. United States v. Peterson, 27 F. Cas. 515 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 16,037).
101. The William Cummings, 29 F. Cas. 1293, 1294 (E.D. Penn. 1870) (No. 17,690).
102. Henrici v. The Laura Madsen, 84 F. 362 (S.D. Cal. 1867).
103. The Almatia, I F. Cas. 535 (D. Or. 1868) (No. 254).
104. McKenna v. The Shawnee, 45 F. 769 (E.D. Wis. 1891).
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1898.05 In 1906, an unplanned extension of the voyage of the whaleship
Bowhead, which lay icebound in the Arctic, as well as dissatisfaction with
provisions and workloads, led the crew of that vessel to mutiny.'06 In 1907,
the crew of the William H. Clifford mutinied in protest of an order to help
unload the ship's cargo, when they had not agreed to this beforehand.' °7 In
1910, the entire crew of the John and Winthrop refused to work because the
master denied them shore leave and, they felt, owed them money which he
refused to pay. 8 Two years later, it was a dispute over the seaworthiness
of the vessel that caused the crew of the Condor to mutiny. 9 And we have
already seen the mutiny in the Hamilton case, aboard a ship called the
Poughkeepsie, where the underlying compliant was the vessel's apparent
unseaworthiness." 0
The same picture of mutiny as a way of describing and prohibiting
shipboard strikes that arose over working conditions emerges from
newspaper accounts-in this case taken from the New York Times-from
the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. For example, in 1882 the
crew of the Vigilant was put in irons by their captain and charged with
mutiny for refusing to work the ship. The seamen, who were described by
the ship's mate as "as good a set of men as ever he sailed with," had
mutinied to protest a diet of rotten meat and "maggoty" bread as well as a
work schedule that reached twenty hours a day."' In 1900, part of the crew
of the Montcalm mutinied-again, they refused to sail the ship-a few
miles down river from New Orleans to protest the hiring of Danish
crewmen and the fact they were served moldy bread and meat that "was full
of worms.""' 2  A 1916 mutiny aboard the liner Brazos, then moored at
Brooklyn, New York, was nothing but a work stoppage to support a
demand for higher wages." 3 Likewise, a 1924 mutiny aboard the schooner
Barnsdell involved nothing more than two sailors refusing to work after
they were made ill by a meal of "stewed tripe."'"' Even those mutinies
mentioned in the newspaper that went beyond simple work stoppages often
began as labor protests. For example, the 1889 mutiny aboard the iron ship
Lindores Abbey, a case where the crew actually imprisoned the captain,
developed out of a dispute about work assignments and orders.' ' The 1886
105. Richards v. The Topgallant, 84 F. 356 (D. Wash. 1898).
106. Belyea v. Cook, 162 F. 180 (N.D. Cal. 1908).
107. The William H. Clifford, 165 F. 59 (E.D. Penn. 1908).
108. The John & Winthrop, 182 F. 380 (9th Cir. 1910).
109. The Condor, 196 F. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
110. Hamilton v. United States, 268 F. 15 (4th Cir. 1920).
Il. A Mutiny in the Harbor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,1882, at 2.
112. Ship's Fare Caused Mutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1900, at 2.
113. Mutiny Successful Liner Brazos Sails, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1916, at 7.
114. Tripe Starts Mutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1924, at 24.
115. Mutiny on the High Seas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1889, at 9.
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mutiny aboard the Frank N. Thayer, which resulted in the killing of the
captain and his mate and the destruction of the ship, was motivated by
beatings and "outrageous tyranny" on the part of the officers. 16
What all these records show is that mutiny, defined by the law to
encompass even the most mundane forms of labor protest and made subject
to very serious punishments, was nonetheless a common feature of
shipboard life in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. Any
shipboard strike was likely to be treated by the captain and by the courts as
mutiny and punished accordingly. And yet seamen not only continued to
mount such protests right through the Depression; in that dynamic era they
embraced it.
IV.
THE RADICALIZATION OF SHIPBOARD LABOR AND THE RISE OF THE
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION
Although in many ways a typical episode of maritime labor protest, the
strike aboard the City of Fort Worth in the summer of 1938 unfolded in a
distinct historical context. As we have seen, seamen in the early Twentieth
Century were the beneficiaries, in theory at least, of considerable protective
legislation. And yet the conditions under which they actually lived and
labored were little changed from the preceding century. By the mid 1930s,
persistent economic crisis had worsened their situation, reducing many of
the country's seamen, who numbered perhaps over 100,000, to truly
desperate circumstances."' At the same time, the early Twentieth Century
marked the beginning of meaningful union representation of seamen. The
dominant union through the 1920s was conservative and largely
concessionary. But by the mid 1930s, seamen had begun in increasing
numbers to embrace a style of unionism that was tactically militant,
politically radical, and altogether more effective than that of its
predecessors. These latter trends were essential features in the rise of the
NMU, to which the City of Fort Worth strikers belonged.
116. How A Mutiny Was Provoked, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1886, at 1.
117. Historian of the CIO Walter Galenson cites government reports that suggest a membership of
140,000 in the 1930s. WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935-41, 427 (1960). This figure is inconsistent with Department of
Census figures that indicate about 64,500 "sailors and deck hands" and 24,000 "captains, masters,
mates, and pilots" in 1930. ALBA M. EDWARDS, POPULATION COMPARATIVE OCCUPATION STATISTICS
FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1870, 1940, 67, tbl.4 (1943). The disparity likely reflects an inherent
difficulty in tracking the number of seamen in this period. According to James Healey, a contemporary
authority on Depression-era seamen, the number of men "shipped, reshipped, and discharged" in 1934
was over 500,000, while the number simply "shipped or reshipped" was about 271,000. But these
figures, he points out, reflect cases of individual assignment, not the number of individual men who
made the labor force that year. That number, he figured, is difficult to fix with such a casual labor force.
HEALEY, supra note 16, at 8-9.
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A. The Condition of Shipboard Labor in the Early Twentieth Century
If the life of seamen in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries bore
little resemblance to romantic visions of seafaring as adventurous
exploration, the world of the seaman in the early Twentieth Century bore
these visions no resemblance at all. The industrialization of merchant
shipping, which had been underway throughout the modem era, culminated
in the early 1900s. The complex art of wind sailing was by then almost
totally replaced by the routine of the factory and all genuine norms of
paternalism by the logic of profit and exploitation. To be sure, paternalism
and other archaic notions of seafaring survived, but only in a very peculiar
way. Completing a process that had begun with capitalism's first
penetration of the maritime world, paternalism was reduced from providing
the structure for a genuine moral economy of shipboard labor, to simply
justifying authority, hierarchy, and wage-labor exploitation.
In fact, with the sole exception of corporal punishment, the conditions
for shipboard labor at the time of the City of Fort Worth strike were
surprisingly little changed from earlier times. Corporal punishment had
largely vanished, as shorter voyages, brought about by the triumph of steam
propulsion over sail, reduced shipboard tension, and union activism finally
yielded effective political and legal responses to the problem.'18 In just
about every other respect, though, the conditions for seamen in the early
Twentieth Century remained awful. Living accommodations were often
crowded and unsanitary, food unpalatable, work schedules grueling, and
discipline arbitrary. According to the United States Maritime Commission,
which was charged under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 with
investigating various aspects of the waterbome shipping industry,
conditions overall in the mid 1930s were simply "deplorable.""..9 To top it
118. NELSON, supra note 36, at 14.
119. Confronting at the outset a serious lack of reliable information on the state of maritime labor,
the Commission held a number of hearings, inspected over forty vessels, and interviewed about 1,000
sailors. The Commission found that by the early 1930s, "some American seamen were receiving as little
as $25 a month, living under wretched conditions, eating unpalatable food, and working 12 hours or
more a day." UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION, ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN
MERCHANT MARINE 46 (1937). On conditions for shipboard labor in the early Twentieth Century, see
also HEALEY, supra note 16, at 47-58; GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 11-12; NELSON, supra note 36 at
15. Adding to their problems, seamen in the 1930s still faced various types of on-shore predation which
had in theory been eliminated by statutes years earlier. Chief among these predatory practices was
"crimping," which was basically a system of corrupt labor agency through which seamen in many ports
were forced to deal in order to get a job on a ship. Usually run through some kind of dockside boarding
house, crimping was premised on skimming a seaman's wages through exorbitant fees, as well as the
equally exploitative practice of playing middle-man to his needs ashore. A waste to everyone except
the crimps themselves, crimping nonetheless survived efforts by organized labor, ship owners, and the
government to put an end to it. According to Nelson, crimping was especially prevalent in East Coast
ports. NELSON, supra note 36, at 15-17. For a seaman's account of crimping in action, see, e.g.,
CHARLES RUBIN, THE LOG OF RUBIN THE SAILOR 86-88 (1973).
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off, seafaring in this period remained among the most dangerous
occupations. .
2 0
The Depression did not fundamentally cause these conditions, which to
a great extent had prevailed aboard ship throughout the modem era. But
combined with the general slump in shipping that followed the First World
War, the economic crisis of the 1930s did worsen conditions considerably.
Desperate men thrown out of work by the collapse of farming and other
industries flooded the docks looking for jobs on a fleet of ships depleted in
number by a dramatic fall off in global trade, undermanned, and poorly
maintained by cost-conscious owners. As a result, many seamen found
themselves either unemployed, working for starvation wages, or, most
extraordinarily, serving as "workaways"--that is, sailing for food and
lodging in lieu of wages. Those who did find paying work aboard ship
were driven ever harder for less wages and were often forced to work far
below their qualifications: licensed officers worked as seamen, skilled
seamen as unskilled. At the same time, the ships on which work could be
found featured even more awful conditions. 121
Exacerbating the problems faced by seamen were, as one authority put
it, the "mechanics of employer job control. '22 In the period between the
end of the First World War and at least the mid-1930s, ship owners,
typically operating through well-organized "associations," perfected a
multi-faceted program designed to reduce labor costs and to undermine
labor organizing. This scheme entailed setting up company-dominated
unions, blacklisting bona fide union organizers and other militants, forcing
seamen to submit to so-called yellow dog contracts, underbidding native
seamen with foreign-born labor, and requiring seamen to maintain
"continuous discharge books," or "fink books," in which employers, in the
guise of tracking a seaman's job history, could carry out their
blacklisting."2 3 According to a leading historian of maritime labor, Bruce
Nelson, this program achieved for employers "nearly complete dominance
in maritime labor relations," which would only be challenged by the
changed legal and political climate and the increased labor militancy of the
mid and late 1930s.'
2 4
Throughout this period, the law remained a largely ineffective
instrument of reform. The most important statute in this regard, the
Lafollette Act, which had been embraced by many in organized labor as the
120. HEALEY, supra note 16, at 103-09.
121. NELSON, supra note 36, at 80-81; GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 117. See also Seamen
Denounce Living Conditions: Maritime Commission Hears Dozen Witnesses Demand Better Quarters,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1937, at 9.
122. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 106.
123. Id. at 106-10.
124. NELSON, supra note 36, at 68-73.
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"Emancipation Proclamation of the Seamen," had so far proved largely
meaningless. While the Lafollette Act on its face comprehensively
addressed the major problems facing shipboard labor-including poor
wages, excessive hours of work, inadequate manning and provisioning,
poor accommodations, lack of medical facilities, inadequate remedies in
cases of injury or sickness, and insufficient safety equipment' 25-- its
enforcement provisions proved utterly inadequate. Initially, the statute's
fundamental weakness was obscured by war-time prosperity, which
generated a temporary boom in American shipping from which labor
broadly benefited. But in the face of the dramatic post-war decline in
shipping and a maritime labor movement thrown into disarray, employers
routinely ignored the law. Indeed, they conspired to do so, reducing the
Lafollette Act to a "dead letter."' 26
B. The Advent of Modern Unionism
Although the first seamen's unions appeared in the mid-Nineteenth
Century, early organizing efforts were sporadic and largely ineffective. Not
until the 1870s and 1880s did serious and more or less permanent unions
begin to emerge. Initially these consisted of regional organizations: the
Lake Seamen's Union; the Sailor's Union of the Pacific; and the Atlantic
Coast Seamen's Union. In late 1899, these regional organizations were
consolidated to form the first significant seamen's union of national scope,
the International Seamen's Union, or ISU.'27 The ISU would remain the
dominant labor organization for seamen until its eventual collapse in the
1930s.
The ISU was above all else a deeply conservative organization with a
number of truly reactionary characteristics. It was constructed along these
lines by a dictatorial figure named Andrew Furuseth, who led the union for
almost fifty years.1 28  From its inception, Furuseth committed the ISU to a
125. For an overview of this regime of formal protections as established largely by the Lafollette
Act, see, for example, Laws and Agreements Governing Working Conditions Among American Seamen,
10 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1075 (May 1920).
126. NELSON, supra note 36, at 44-45; see also GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 50-71.
127. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 16-22.
128. For Furuseth, sailing was a skilled calling rightly reserved to the Nordic "races" and in danger
of being debased by the twin forces of industrialization and the intrusion of lesser races. Thus for
Furuseth, as for many craft unionists of the day (and a few industrial unionists), racism and nativism
were necessary features of effective unionism. Improving the conditions of maritime labor was not
simply for the good of white seamen, it was necessary to prevent the industry's takeover by "Orientals,"
blacks, and other "inferior" races-an eventuality that would, in turn, damage the interests of white
civilization. Jerold S. Auerbach, Progressives at Sea: The La Follette Act of 1915, 2 LAB. HIST. 344,
346-47 (1961). In this light, Furuseth understood one of the LaFollette Act's key "safety" features-the
requirement that a majority of the crew speak English, which Senator Robert LaFollette himself saw as
contributing to better responses to emergencies-in the following terms: "It will mean safety to our part
of the human race, national safety, and racial safety as well." Id. at 355 (quoting Andrew Furuseth, The
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vision centered on notions of craft integrity, bourgeois respectability, and
deference to the fundamental institutions of capital. Accordingly, the ISU
required that its members abide shipboard discipline, respect conventional
notions of private property and contract, and follow the union leadership's
policies implicitly. While it did on occasion strike, under Furuseth the ISU
put much greater faith in collective bargaining and legislative reform. Even
more so than other craft unions of the day, which were notorious in this
regard, the ISU advanced a deeply racist and xenophobic program and
adhered firmly to this from its inception through the 1930s. Designed either
to exclude blacks and "Orientals" entirely from shipboard employment, or
at a minimum to reduce their numbers and confine them to the lowest ranks,
the ISU's racist agenda dramatically increased the level of segregation
among American seafarers.'29
Initially, the ISU's conservative program yielded some results. It was
the ISU that successfully championed passage of the LaFollette Act, just as
its antecedents had in the 1890s successfully lobbied passage of the White
Act, and before that, another reformist statute, the Maguire Act.130
Moreover, in the first decade of the Twentieth Century, the ISU enjoyed
great success organizing seamen, particularly those on the Pacific Coast and
the Great Lakes. The union eventually managed to achieve a number of
collective bargaining agreements featuring wage scales and grievance
arbitration provisions. During the First World War, when shipboard labor
was in relatively short supply and the federal government willing to compel
employer compromises for the sake of labor peace, the ISU extended these
gains. By the war's end, perhaps nine out of ten seamen were members of
the organization and overall membership reached over 100,000.131
The ISU's post-war experience was much less impressive, however.
Presented in 1921 with a demand by ship owners for substantial economic
concessions, the union refused and called a strike, which was then soundly
defeated. Already doomed by resurgent government hostility, unfavorable
economic conditions, and employers' increasingly effective use of job
Seamen's Law and Its Critics, AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. VI 66 (1916)). On Furuseth's life and influence,
see also ARNOLD BERWICK, THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN OF THE SEA: THE LIFE OF ANDREW FURUSETH
(1993); HYMAN WEINTRAUB, ANDREW FURUSETH, EMANCIPATOR OF THE SEAMEN (1959).
129. On the ISU's political orientation, see, for example, NELSON, supra note 36, at 40-50;
GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 28-30, 50-51. Blacks had long constituted a substantial component of
American seafaring and other maritime labor. See, e.g., W. JEFFERY BOLSTER, BLACK JACKS: AFRICAN
AMERICAN SEAMEN IN THE AGE OF SAIL 69-70, 178 (1997). On Chinese and Chinese American
participation in this workforce, see, for example, Robert J. Schwendinger, Chinese Sailors: America's
Invisible Merchant Marine, 1876-1903, 57 CAL. HIST. 58 (1978).
130. Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28, 30 Stat. 755 (White Act); Act of Feb. 18, 1895, ch. 97, 28 Star.
667 (Maguire Act).
131. PHILIP TAFT, The Unlicensed Seafaring Unions, 3 INDUS. & AND LAB. REL. REV. 187 (1949-
50); NELSON, supra note 36, at 51; GALENSON, supra note 117, at 428.
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control strategies, the strike's defeat was hastened by the ISU's relentless
white supremacy, which gave racial minorities in the maritime trades little
reason to respect its picket lines.3 2  In any case, defeat left the union's
membership disillusioned and demoralized and the organization ill-
prepared to contend with the structural realities of the post-war period. As
jobs evaporated and wages declined, so too did ISU membership. Indeed,
membership fell from over 100,000 to 50,000 within a few months after the
defeat of the strike and would continue to fall to around 15,000 in 1926 and
probably fewer than 5,000 in the early 1930s.'33
Even before its post-war/post-strike collapse, the ISU found its
conservative, craft orientation challenged by a rival current of radical
industrial unionism. Occasionally, this impulse emerged from within the
ISU's own affiliates; more often at this juncture it came from a rival union
movement, affiliated with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).
Committed to industrial unionism, direct action, and a syndicalist social
vision, the IWW came to some prominence in the seafaring world of the
late 1910s and early 1920s by offering a radical alternative to the racism,
xenophobia, and general conservatism of the craft union movement.'34
Never approaching the ISU's peak membership numbers in the first place,
the IWW's seamen's affiliate, the Maritime Transport Workers, Local 510,
suffered from all of its parent union's notorious organizational
shortcomings and was unable to translate its widespread appeal into stable,
functional membership. 3 ' By the mid 1920s, these organizational
shortcomings had combined with relentless official repression as well as the
post-war shipping slump to drive the IWW out of the maritime trades
almost entirely. In the meantime, though, the union left a lasting mark.
The IWW introduced thousands of seamen to a militant, leftist alternative to
the ISU's conservative agenda. Many of these men would play key roles in
the surge of radical unionism of the 1930s.
By the mid-1920s, the seamen's unions had been "laid low as if by a
tidal wave.' 36 The collapse of both the ISU and the IWW left seamen to
face dismal post-war conditions without any effective union representation.
Well organized into various associations, and drawing substantial support
from government subsidies and a weak and compliant regulatory agency,
132. NELSON, supra note 36, at 55.
133. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 120-21; GALENSON, supra note 117, at 428.
134. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 120-21.
135. On the history of the Marine Transport Workers, and the IWW's role on the waterfront, see,
generally, Nelson Van Valen, "Cleaning up the Harbor": The Suppression of the I. W. W. At San Pedro,
1922-1925, 66 S. CAL. Q. 147 (1984); Bernard A. Cook & James R. Watson, The Sailors and Marine
Transport Workers' 1913 Strike in New Orleans: The AFL and the IWW, 18 S. STUD. I 1 (1979). Cf
Lisa McGirr, Black and White Longshoremen in the IWW." A History of the Philadelphia Marine
Transport Workers Industrial Union Local 8, 36 LAB. HIST. 377 (1995).
136. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 118.
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the United States Shipping Board, 137 the ship owners were able to give full
effect to their various job control devices. Ship owners found themselves
"in sole control of labor policy" aboard ship. 38 Well before the Depression,
owners were already reducing wages, doubling watches, blacklisting
unionists, and sailing ships that were either totally unseaworthy or woefully
lacking in decent accommodations. Needless to say, with the onset of the
Depression, conditions deteriorated even further. 39
Under these increasingly desperate conditions, even the conservative
and weakened ISU was occasionally ready to endorse ship-side, if not
shipboard, strikes. Predictably, militant remnants of the IWW went even
further by undertaking shipboard strikes as well. 40 In part because of the
threat of mutiny charges in the atmosphere of intense labor repression of the
1920s, though, the shipboard strike tactic was seldom undertaken with any
regularity. And none of these strikes did much either to undermine
employer hegemony. 141 It would take another decade and a new labor
movement with altogether new organizations to begin to accomplish this.
C. The Rise of Militant and Radical Shipboard Labor
The decline of seamen's unions in the 1920s and first few years of the
1930s was slowly halted and then reversed beginning about 1933. This
revival of unionism among seamen, which would prove nothing short of
spectacular, was the product of a number of complex forces. The most
obvious of these included the very high levels of unemployment and
pauperization caused by the Depression, the final culmination of
industrialization in the maritime industry, as well as the rise in workers'
expectations and ambitions brought about by apparent legitimation of
organized labor on the part of the Franklin Roosevelt administration and the
New Deal Congress. 142  As much as any of these factors, though, it was
effective organizing that made the second half of the 1930s so different for
seamen than previous years. By vigorous and intelligent organizing,
seamen were finally able to convert awful working conditions,
industrialization, and the apparent promise of a more progressive political
137. Created in 1916 to help coordinate the maritime war effort, the United States Shipping Board
was not abolished until 1934. The Shipping Board was generally complicit in advancing employers' job
control agenda. Id. at 106-10.
138. TAFr, supra note 131, at 192.
139. See GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 104-29.
140. See, e.g, Strike of Seamen Delays Few Ships, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1923, at 4; L W. W. Union
Calls Ship Strike Here, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1926, at 7.
141. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 120. The IWW's favorable disposition toward "mutiny" had
long been interpreted as an expression of its seditious character. See, e.g., Oil Ship Mutiny was L W. W.
Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1917, at 1.
142. GALENSON, supra note 117, at 428-29.
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and legal order, into unions able to challenge employer hegemony.
This renewed success in organizing seamen was largely the work of
leftist organizers. Many of these organizers were associated with the
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO), which emerged in 1935 with
a mission to organize the millions of industrial workers so far largely
ignored by its parent organization, the craft-oriented American Federation
of Labor (AFL).'43 Many of the most capable of these CIO organizers were
members or allies of the Communist Party.' Typically disciplined,
principled, and well trained, these communists were instrumental in
organizing seamen and other maritime workers. It is no exaggeration to say
that communists were ultimately vital to the successful organization of
shipboard labor in the 1930s.
At the same time, it is important to note that the role of communists in
the maritime labor movement of the 1930s was also complex. This
reflected chaotic strategy on the part of the Party itself. Between 1928 and
1934 the Party held to a policy of "dualism" premised on the formation of
independent communist unions that would vie with their rivals for
influence. 145 After 1934, though, the strategy was changed (actually
changed back-for the cycle had begun earlier) to one of "boring from
within," by which communists sought membership in rival unions in a bid
to exert influence, if not outright control, over those organizations. 46 While
this latter strategy tended to lend credence to notions of communists as
devious conspirators bent on exploiting legitimate labor organizations for
ulterior political ends, the facts reveal a rather less pernicious role. In the
maritime context, as in other industries, boring from within offered labor
activists opportunities to steer unions towards more progressive forms of
industrial unionism and especially to challenge racist and xenophobic
policies. In only a few cases were communists inclined simply to hijack
incumbent unions.
147
Communists played the leading role in the formation of two important
seamen's unions that appeared in succession in the late 1920s and 1930s:
the Marine Workers Industrial Union, or MWIU, and the NMU itself. A
143. Formed in late 1935, the CIO was initially an appendage of the AFL. In 1938, however, the
CIO disassociated itself from the AFL and renamed itself the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The
two federations clashed often and bitterly until 1954, when the CIO, weakened by government instigated
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history, see, generally, GALENSON, supra note 117.
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brief review of the history of each reveals much about the nuanced, and
generally progressive nature of communist involvement in maritime labor
in this period. It also reveals much about the forces that lead to the City of
Fort Worth strike.
The MWIU was formed in the spring of 1930 in New York City.'48
Delegates arrived in many cases in the fashion of the IWW, by "hoboeing"
in on freight trains. 4 9 Many were blacks, and perhaps half were veterans of
the IWW. Although it is not clear how many delegates were actually
Communist Party members, it is clear that the communists were important
in framing the union's structure and its ideology. 5 Much more than the
NMU or other CIO unions, the MWIU was at least initially subject to
significant, if ineffective, attempts at control by the Communist
International.'' Open to seamen, longshoremen, and other maritime
workers, the MWIU was fundamentally committed to unionism along
industrial lines and the repudiation of the ISU's craft parochialism and
general conservatism. 5 ' Although it was not always successful in the face
of decades of segregation and racial privilege, the MWIU zealously
advanced a policy of racial equality.'53 The organization likewise advanced
the cause of socialist revolution, exhorting the ideals of workers'
revolution, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism.'54
Above all else, though, the MWIU aspired to function as a rank-and-
file union. Despite the Party's attempts to control it, the union's leaders
were for the most part neither Party functionaries nor professional union
bureaucrats, but rather seamen, longshoremen, and other industrial
workers.'55 The union's leaders made sincere efforts to address the needs of
the union's members. Overall, the leadership of the MWIU was also
dedicated, principled, and generally above the corruption that ran through
the ISU and other maritime unions of the day.
56
MWIU membership probably never exceeded 5,000; but in the early
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1930s this was at least as many as the ISU.'57 And unlike the ISU, the
MWIU was a vibrant organization with influence beyond its numbers. By
1933 it was organizing political protests (including tenant protests),
attempting to establish its own hiring halls,158 and, most importantly,
orchestrating shipboard strikes against dockside vessels.' 59 These tactics, in
particular the ready resort to shipboard strikes, would prove especially
influential in subsequent labor disputes. 60  Later the MWIU played a
central role in the huge maritime strike that erupted on the West Coast in
the summer of 1934. The MWIU's ability to strike several vessels calling
on San Francisco proved instrumental in converting a limited strike by
longshoremen into a general work stoppage that would last eighty-three
bloody days and build a tide of labor militancy among maritime workers.'61
Yet in a political climate still skeptical of, if not overtly hostile to, radical
unionism, the MWIU was unable to translate its burgeoning
respectability-which was considerable, even among many ISU
members-into lasting organizational gains. And it suffered from
organizational shortcomings. By February 1935, the MWIU had withered
away, its leaders and activists abandoning the strategy of dual unionism and
once again "going underground" to bore from within. 6 '
Ironically, the ISU was the immediate beneficiary of the 1934 strike as
well as an East Coast strike that the MWIU orchestrated later that fall. The
ISU was able to regain thousands of members as well as recognition by
dozens of East Coast companies. In spite of depressed economic
conditions, it even managed to negotiate collective bargaining agreements
157. In 1934, the organization claimed 12,000 members; but this was likely an exaggerated figure.
GALENSON, supra note 117, at 433.
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with those companies."' This did not reflect any genuine redress of the
union's fundamental weaknesses, however. Instead, the ISU's success
seemed to follow from a generalized increase in seamen's interest in union
representation-which the MWIU helped create, but could not take
advantage of-as well as the union's success in presenting itself to workers
and employers alike as a less militant and less radical alternative to the
MWIU. The union's leadership remained incredibly corrupt, reactionary,
and inept. On the East Coast especially the ISU repeatedly failed to provide
seamen with effective representation, even by its own debased standards.
Moreover, even as the ISU recovered some of its old influence, it was being
compromised from within by ex-MWIU or ex-IWW members and other
radicals, who were "swarm[ing] into the ISU, despite the desire of [ISU]
officials to keep them out.' ' "6 It was by this infusion of radicals into the
ISU that the ISU-in another ironic turn-would eventually give birth to
the NMU.
The precipitating events in the birth of the NMU began to unfold in
1935. At the beginning of that year, the ISU negotiated an agreement with
several dozen East Coast owners that offered its members less favorable
terms than those negotiated by West Coast seamen later that year. 165 When
this contract expired at the end of 1935, ISU leaders proposed simply to
renew its terms.166  A surge of rank-and-file dissension caused the
leadership to reconsider and put the issue to a referendum, where the
membership demanded higher wages, better overtime rules, and more
effective hiring hall procedures.167 Indeed, eventually the membership
demanded instead point-by-point parity with West Coast seamen.168
Unmoved by this current of disaffection, in March, 1936, the ISU
leadership signed a modified, but ultimately concessionary contract. 1
69
In January 1936 as all this played out, over 300 members of the crew
of the passenger liner Pennsylvania, which had sailed from New York,
walked off the ship in San Francisco. This strike was but the most notable
of scores, if not hundreds, of "interruptions to the operation of American
merchant vessels" by "insubordinate" crews to protest the leadership's
concessionary bargaining.17° Many of these were orchestrated by a Rank-
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and-File committee, which had been put together by MWIU veterans
precisely to mobilize the rank-and-file against the ISU's leadership.
Although the Pennsylvania strike helped to compel the union leadership to
submit the agreement to a referendum, the striking crew members were
summarily discharged and left stranded in San Francisco. Several weeks
later, the Pennsylvania's sister ship, the California, approached San
Francisco, having also sailed from New York. In an unsuccessful bid to
avoid sympathy action on behalf of the stranded Pennsylvania crew, the
California was diverted to San Pedro. Here, though, the California's crew
met a delegation from the Pennsylvania. Informed of the situation, they
returned to their ship, and through their ad hoc spokesman, an "obscure"
seaman named Joseph Curran who had briefly been an MWIU member,
notified the California's captain that they would not sail the ship back to
New York without the Pennsylvania's stranded seamen."' Panama Pacific,
the company that owned the ships (actually, a subsidiary of International
Mercantile Marine), agreed to the crew's initial demand; but Curran quickly
followed with another: that East Coast companies pay West Coast wages.
Expecting a walkout and a conventional strike on the dock, Panama
Pacific began to recruit replacements. Curran, though, had organized a
shipboard strike. The crew remained aboard, but refused to perform any
duties beyond maintaining the ship in a safe condition and tending to the
passengers' needs. For three days this continued. In a move that
anticipated subsequent events aboard the City of Fort Worth, Panama
Pacific, as well as the Secretary of Commerce called for the Justice
Department to charge Curran and the other strikers with mutiny.'72 Panama
Pacific even took out an advertisement in various newspapers advocating
this position.'73 Perhaps not surprisingly, the ISU leadership supported the
company on this point and sought first to reign in and then to expel the
"mutineers."' 74 In the meantime, Curran, who had little experience in union
matters but quickly proved to be tough and pragmatic leader with a knack
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for dealing with labor disputes, found himself negotiating via a waterfront
payphone with Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, who was called away
from a dinner with the President.17 According to the strikers, Perkins
promised Curran that if the strikers agreed to sail the ship, no mutiny
charges would be brought and (more controversially) that the company
would not be allowed to discriminate against the strikers.IS6
With some effort, Perkins was able to keep the first of these promises
against the wishes of others in the Roosevelt administration. But when the
California reached New York, Curran and around sixty other seamen were
docked six days wages, fired, and effectively blacklisted for their role in the
strike. Curran's group promptly organized a picket of the California,
preventing it from hiring a crew and sailing on its next voyage.'77 The
strikers' narrow aim was to get the fired seamen reinstated; their broader
aim was to force all East Coast owners to extend West Coast wages and
conditions and to oust the ISU leadership.' The strike lasted nine weeks,
featured a number of bloody incidents, and eventually involved 4,500
seamen.'79 Though it left the ISU leadership intact, this strike did earn the
seamen some concessions. These entailed agreements by employers and
the union leadership to handle grievances more efficiently, to reinstate
perhaps some of the strikers who had been discharged and expelled from
the union, and to seek certain improvements in hours and wages.8 ° Of
more lasting significance, the strike also established within the ISU a core
group of insurgents, lead by Curran and other capable organizers, with
immense credibility among an increasingly disgruntled rank-and-file.
Over the next year or so, this insurgent faction-the Rank-and-
Filers-attempted to force the ISU leadership to undertake significant
reforms. They pressured the ISU's parent, the AFL, to bring about these
reforms. And they also undertook (unsuccessful) court action in a bid to
175. M'Grady's Efforts Fail to End Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,1936, at 47.
176. Secretary Perkins may have been misunderstood by the strikers-or she may have lied to them
to end the strike. Ship Strikers Face Chief Foe In Conservatives of Own Union, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
1936, at 19; How Miss Perkins Ended Ship Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1936, at 43. The effort to
forestall mutiny charges involved complicated negotiations among government officials and the
intervention of a committee, chaired by New York attorney Louis S. Weiss, which had just completed a
scathing report on the state of shipboard accommodations. California Strike Held Not Mutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 25, 1938, at 29.
177. Ousted Men Push 1M.M. Ship Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1936, at 29. The ship eventually
sailed, only to be forced back to port by serious mechanical failures. California Forced to Cancel
Voyage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1936, at 6.
178. NELSON,supra note 36, at 214-15.
179. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 580. In one particularly bloody clash in May, 1936, 221 strikers
were arrested and scores beaten by New York police. 221 Strikers Seized In Battles With Police Here,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1936, at 1.
180. PHILIP TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 198 (1954); Seamen End
Strike, Fearing Cause Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1936, at I.
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oust the ISU's leadership and set aside ISU-negotiated agreements. In
some instances the Rank-and-Filers even demanded recognition directly
from owners. In all these efforts they were, for the time being,
unsuccessful.181 To greater effect, the insurgents launched a relentless
series of shipboard strikes involving scores of individual vessels. 112 In late
1936 and early 1937, Curran's group also mobilized thousands of East
Coast seamen to join another massive West Coast maritime strike-once
again a violent affair that achieved a few concessions from employers but
enhanced the militant faction's reputation.183
Within a few months, Curran and his group had managed to construct a
rival union structure within the ISU. According to the NMU's own
publication, by the fall of 1936, the Rank-and-Filers enjoyed the support of
20,000 men, representing the vast majority of East Coast ISU members. 84
A number of ship owners recognized this fact and granted Rank-and-File
agents "shore passes" (actually boarding passes) normally reserved for
recognized representatives-a tacit, if limited, form of recognition. Indeed,
early in 1937 International Mercantile Marine-the owner of Panama
Pacific-petitioned the newly established NLRB to conduct an election to
clarify and formalize the representation issue."' But as long as Curran's
group was merely a collection of insurgents and not a genuine rival union,
and as long as the ISU enjoyed incumbent status, the NLRB refused to do
this. 186
The situation began to change in late spring, 1937, when the crew of
the President Roosevelt-yet another International Mercantile Marine
vessel-launched a shipboard strike as the ship lay in New York harbor to
protest discrimination in hiring based on union affiliation. In essence, the
strikers demanded separate recognition of the Rank-and-File faction.
While this was not the first time the group used the shipboard strike in this
way, previous gains were limited. On May 4, though, International
Mercantile agreed to allow Rank-and-File delegates aboard its ships-and
to hire crew through the Rank-and-File's hiring hall. Within two days,
181. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 583-84.
182. See, e.g., Ship Union Fights 'Outlaw' Strikers; Will Man Vessels, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1936,
at 1; 18 Vessel Tied Up Here; Strike Hits Other Ports; U.S. Ready to Intervene, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1936, at 1. For a detailed account of the Rank-and-Filers' successful use of the threat of a "sit-down"
strike to displace the ISU representation on three ships docked at Philadelphia in late March 1937, see
RUBIN, supra note 119, at 251-53.
183. See, e.g., Strikers on Coast Widen "Blockade", N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1936, at 22; 1500
Seamen Call Active Strike Here for 'Wage Parity', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1936, at 1.
184. ON A TRUE COURSE: THE STORY OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME UNION, AFL-CIO 34 (1967).
For the sake of convenience, I use the term "East Coast" to describe the Atlantic Coast, as well as the
Gulf Coast and Great Lakes.
185. Int'l Mercantile Marine, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 971 (1937).
186. TAFT, supra note 180, at 198-99.
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Curran announced the formation of the NMU.
187
Now desperate, the ISU leadership responded to this surge in NMU
success with a final act of incompetence. The ISU petitioned the NLRB to
conduct representation elections at virtually all the East Coast companies.
The Board held the elections, which yielded entirely predictable results. At
the end of a campaign involving crews on over 700 ships, the NMU carried
the vote at over fifty shipping lines and the ISU less than ten. In virtually
every election that it won, the NMU prevailed by a wide majority.'88 By
mid summer, the NMU claimed 35,000 members; by the end of that year, a
still-growing NMU held 47,000 members while the ISU was once again
essentially defunct. 89
While committed from the outset to industrial unionism, for the first
several years of its existence the NMU retained some of the decentralized,
craft union structures of the ISU in the form of separate departments for
deck, engine, and steward sailors and separate districts for the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts and the Great Lakes. 9 ' In other respects, though, the new union
was radically different from its predecessor. Most delegates at the first
constitutional convention in July, 1937, were working seamen-not, as had
long been typical with the ISU, shore bound bureaucrats.' 9' Many were
communists, IWW veterans, or, as was often the case, both. At its founding
convention, the NMU formalized its affiliation with the CIO and committed
itself to an agenda centered on improving working conditions, maintaining
union democracy, advancing social welfare, unifying the maritime labor
movement, and achieving racial equality. Unlike the MWIU, the NMU was
never really subject to Communist Party attempts at manipulation.' 92
The NMU took its larger social vision quite seriously. It quickly stood
out even among CIO unions for its dogged commitment to racial equality
187. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 584; GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 154-55. See also Ship Union
Formed as A.F. of L. Rival, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1937, at 1.
188. The available authorities differ slightly on the respective number of lines carried by each
union, with Philip Taft claiming a 54-9 advantage for the NMU, while Nelson claims an advantage of
52-6. TAFT, supra note 180, at 198; NELSON, supra note 36, at 231.
189. NELSON, supra note 36, at 231; BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 684-85; ON A TRUE COURSE,
supra note 184, at 40. On the West Coast, the ISU's main affiliate, the Sailor's Union of the Pacific, or
SUP, would also break away from the parent union. The SUP was expelled from the AFL in 1936 and
then briefly flirted with CIO affiliation (a referendum was held, but the ballots never counted). This
ended its association with the ISU. In 1938 the SUP leadership formed the Seafarers' International
Union, made the SUP its main affiliate, and re-affiliated the whole organization with the AFL. NELSON,
supra note 36, at 241.
190. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 585; GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 166-67. This structure was
abandoned in 1939 in favor of a more streamlined industrial union structure. GALENSON, supra note
117, at 443.
191. According to the NMU, the union's first convention was attended by "135 delegates from 118
ships and 68 from 14 ports"; the delegates had to make their own way to the convention. ON A TRUE
COURSE supra note 184, at 40. See also BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 485.
192. ON A TRUE COURSE, supra note 184, at 40-41; GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 167-68.
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and earned a lasting reputation for this stance.193 But the NMU also
represented its members in conventional ways. By November 1937, the
union was negotiating its first contracts; by 1938 it had taken over from the
ISU the customary practice of bargaining with the large, multi-employer
associations. 194  Though wracked by a number of tensions that included
unwieldy organizational structures, a growing rivalry with the ISU's
resurgent West Coast affiliate, the Sailor's Union of the Pacific, and
mounting red and race baiting, the NMU had quickly established itself as
the largest and most vibrant seamen's union. Its success raised for the first
time the promise of mass representation of American seamen by a
principled and effective labor union.
The NMU's tremendous ascent was achieved largely by frequent and
skillful resort to shipboard strikes. By striking aboard ship, seamen hit their
employers at the point of production. They were able to avoid being
replaced or marooned in distant ports and they were usually able to tie up
the ship and its cargo or passengers. The ship's officers and owners were
thereby forced to confront the strikers' demands and do so from an
unaccustomed position of relative weakness.'95 It was this tactic, clearly,
that allowed the NMU to sweep aside the ISU, to force employers to take it
seriously, and to build a solid membership.
To the extent that these strikes represented a shipboard version of the
sit-down strike-and they were often described this way in the press-their
use simply reflected the adoption of a form of labor protest that proved
essential to the CIO's broader campaign from 1936 through 1938 to
organize the major heavy industries. 96 And however one judges its legality
or morality, there can be no doubt that sit-down strikes were absolutely
193. The NMU leadership maintained its commitment to racial justice even in the face of resistance
from racist employers and a sometimes reluctant membership. NELSON, supra note 36, at 259; Donald
T. Critchlow, Communist Unions and Racism, 17 LAB. HIST. 230 (1976). The NMU was condemned as
a "nigger union" by racist seamen. See, e.g., RICHARD 0. BOYER, THE DARK SHIP 36-37 (1947). In his
memoirs, NMU organizer Charles Rubin tells of both the strident efforts of the union's leadership to
confront racism among seamen and owners, and the vexing difficulties they sometimes encountered.
RtBIN, supra note 119, at 273-76.
194. TAFT, supra note 180, at 200-01.
195. In the late Spring and Summer of 1937, for example, numerous shipboard strikes by NMU
crew seeking recognition or concessions were reported in the New York Times. Remarkably, all were at
least partially successful. See, e.g., 70 Of Crew Strike As Liner Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1937, at
33; NLRB Plea Fails to Halt Ship Row: Crews on Two Freighters Here Continue Sit-Dows and Strikes
Hit Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1937, at 6; Strike Holds Up Sailing, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1937, at 3;
Seamen Call Strike on Lykes Ship Line: Action Ties Up Five Vessels-Working Conditions and
'Recognition'atl Issue, N.Y. TIMES May 18, 1937, at 46; Strike of CLO. Foes Holds Ship 8 Hours, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1937, at 47; Sit-Down on Four Ships Ends in Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1937, at
10; Ship Group Calls for Strike Here; Tie-Up on Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1936, at 1.
196. In 1937, the height of this campaign, which focused on the automobile, tire, and steel
industries, there were 400 sit-down strikes involving almost 400,000 employees. BERNSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 499-501.
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essential to the successful organization of these industries. Indeed, these
strikes did as least as much to reverse decades of anti-union policies in the
United States as did the mere passage of the Wagner Act or the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Time and again, sit-down strikes were decisive in
overcoming a concerted campaign among employers to ignore the law's
obligation to recognize and bargain with labor unions. At the same time,
many participants in these strikes embraced the very plausible view that
they held a property right, of sorts, to their jobs, and that such right could
only be vindicated by the sit-down strike.'97
In fact, there were real differences between shipboard strikes and true
sit-down strikes.'98 True sit-down strikes involved workers seizing
possession and effective control of their workplace, sometimes violently
and for weeks on end; shipboard strikes of the 1930s, like the vast majority
of their predecessors, usually involved nothing more than part of a ship's
crew simply refusing to work while remaining aboard a vessel that was
safely moored to dock and that doubled as their home. Unfortunately for
the NMU, though, the courts took an intolerant view of militant labor
protest no matter how peaceful, one that was more concerned with
protecting the rights of property and capital against any effective challenge,
than either drawing fine distinctions of law or applying the law in a realistic
way. This orientation emerges very clearly in Southern Steamship.
The NMU was not done organizing seamen on the East Coast; neither
had employers ceased the practices-illegal and otherwise-that tended to
inspire this kind of labor militancy in the first place. Despite growing
frustration among owners and other business interests, and growing unease
about the tactic among union leadership, the shipboard strike remained a
common feature of NMU organizing efforts throughout 193 7 and 193 8.199
197. According to Walter Galenson, the sit-down strike was tolerated for a time by the courts and
the government precisely because it was often the only way for workers to compel employers to
recognize and bargain with their unions-as the law clearly required. GALENSON, supra note 117, at
143-48.
198. This will be explored infra Part V.
199. In fact, the NMU leadership made some efforts to discourage shipboard strikes once it
emerged in 1937 as a legitimate union. See, e.g., Warns Ship Crews Against Sit-Downs: Curran
Declares 'Disruptive Elements' Seek to Break Up Maritime Union, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1939, at 42.
These efforts were not very successful, though. By the time the City of Fort Worth was struck in July,
1938, about 100 members had been stripped of their sailing certificates by the Marine Inspection and
Navigation Bureau for participating in such strikes. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 175. See also Sea
Strikers Held on Mutiny Charge: Twenty-Five Men of Ship Sagebrush Staged Sit-Down in Philadelphia
N.Y. TIMES June 29, 1938, at 5. By early 1938, Joseph Kennedy, father of the future president and
senators, and chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, was advocating legislation to
prevent shipboard strikes; this he did against the views of Secretary of Labor Perkins, who favored a
more patient approach. Kennedy Demands Sea Strike Curb; Scores Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
1938, at 1.
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V.
THE CITY OF FORT WORTH STRIKE AND THE SOUTHERN STEAMSHIP
DECISION
In one sense, the strike aboard the City of Fort Worth in July 1938
represented a small skirmish in a larger campaign by the NMU to displace
the ISU and gain meaningful recognition from all East Coast ship owners.
In a broader sense, the strike reflected a longer-standing struggle between
seamen to gain more control over and better conditions within a workplace
in which the impersonal norms of industrial capitalism predominated, in
which authority, deprivation, and class conflict were uniquely salient, and
in which the law meant next to nothing on paper. Moreover, what occurred
that summer in Houston and Philadelphia forced the Supreme Court to
confront more directly than in any other case the limits of the rights of labor
protest under the Wagner Act. For unlike the true sit-down strikes, the City
of Fort Worth strike presented the Court with a tactic that was both very
effective in advancing labor's cause against capital and, as the many
counter-arguments in Southern Steamship show, not at all clearly illegal or
threatening to anything beyond the employer's complete sovereignty in the
workplace. The Courts' response to those arguments expressed very clearly
a view that the seamen would remain subject to traditional notions of
maritime service and, further, that the traditional notions of private property
and contract should prevail fundamentally intact against the challenge
posed--either directly by New Deal labor or by labor's allies in
government. In the end seamen were left with no real right to strike at all,
and the right of all workers to strike was substantially compromised.
A. The Strike Aboard the City of Fort Worth
Southern Steamship Company was one of the fifty or so companies
named by the ISU in its fatal petition to the NLRB to hold representation
elections." 0 The company, a Delaware corporation based in Philadelphia,
operated seven ships, all of which sailed regular routes between Houston
and Philadelphia."' Prior to the Board election, which was held in October
1937, the ISU held a contract with Southern Steamship. But in the Board's
opinion the ISU had waived any rights of incumbency under the contract by
200. Am. France Line, 3 N.L.R.B. 64 (1937).
201. In 1937, these vessels carried 341,581 tons of cargo. They were not large. All seven totaled
only 18,382 gross tons (a measure of cargo capacity by volume)-compared to over 7,000 gross tons for
a single Second World War 'Liberty Ship' and over 80,000 gross tons for the passenger liner Queen
Elizabeth, launched the same year as the strike aboard the City of Fort Worth. This information emerges
from the Board's fact-finding for decisions involving the company. S. S.S. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1088,
1089 (1939); S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 29 (1940). The City of Fort Worth itself was apparently a
general cargo vessel constructed in 1919 by the McDougall-Duluth Company at Duluth, Minnesota, for
the United States Shipping Board. Originally named La Crosse, it was renamed in 1925.
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filing the petition.02 In any case, the NMU's victory over the ISU among
Southern Steamship employees was decisive. Out of 134 eligible voters,
132 cast ballots; of the 128 ballots that were counted, 73 were for NMU
representation, 51 for neither the NMU nor the ISU, and only 4 for the
ISU.
20 3
Southern Steamship immediately challenged the results of the election
on the grounds that its representative was not present for the vote on one of
its ships, the City of Houston.2' Despite the fact that the Board rejected this
claim out of hand, the company refused to recognize the union. Between
late January 1938, when the Board affirmed the NMU's representative
status, and August 1938, after the strike aboard the City of Fort Worth, the
NMU's Philadelphia business agent, Paul Palazzi, made repeated attempts
by letter and phone, and in person, to initiate bargaining with Southern
Steamship officials and to obtain shore passes. The company either ignored
or refused each request.
2°5
The decision to strike Southern Steamship in order to force it to
recognize the NMU and to grant the shore passes was made on July 17,
1938, by thirteen crewmen from the City of Fort Worth who had met in a
Houston union hall to discuss the matter. They represented over half of the
"unlicensed" seamen-the non-officers over whom the NMU enjoyed
representative status-of the crew. At 8:00 a.m. the next morning, one of
these men, John J. Tracey "failed to turn on the steam" to the machinery
needed to load the ship's cargo. When the ship's assistant engineer turned
it on himself, Tracey had another crewman "throw the pumps." Eventually
the ship's officers and the six seamen who did not strike got the steam up.
But in the meantime the thirteen strikers gathered on the poop deck, which
served as the crew's "general meeting place" when not on duty, and refused
to do any further work.2"6
While the City of Fort Worth's officers managed to load its cargo, they
202. Am. France Line, 3 N.L.R.B. at 71.
203. Am. France Line, 4 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1141 (1938).
204. The Board found that Southern Steamship had no right to observe the election. In any case,
both the ISU and NMU consented to the presence of company representatives at subsequent elections
aboard the other ships. Am. France Line, 4 N.L.R.B. at 1141. In 1939, the Board found that Southern
Steamship had unlawfully discharged and refused to reinstate the chief engineer of the City of
Philadelphia, who was a member of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, which was allied with
the NMU, for his participation in one of the strikes of 1936. The employee, one Max Starke, had an
exemplary service record and was recommended by the captain of the City of Philadelphia for
reinstatement. He was also the last of the crew to go out on strike, having remained on board for several
days after the strike commenced. S. S.S. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. at 1090-91.
205. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 31-32; Transcript of Record at 90-121, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
206. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 33. Tracey and the other four seamen, who would be discharged
when the ship reached Philadelphia, were delegates or otherwise active in the union's organizing
campaign. Transcript of Record at 127-29, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
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could not get the ship under way as long as the strike continued. At 10:30
a.m. the captain recited a copy of the strikers' shipping articles and
demanded that they return to work. Their spokesman, Joseph Warren,
responded by reiterating the strikers' demands and pointing out to the
captain that the law-the Wagner Act-was actually in the strikers' favor.
Later that morning, the captain summoned to the ship the deputy United
States Shipping Commissioner, who also recited the articles, but to no
avail." 7 The strike continued through the afternoon, during which time the
strikers were allowed to remain on board the ship. In fact they were all
allowed their lunch and some of them were permitted to go ashore to confer
with the union's shore delegates.20 8 During the meantime, negotiations
began between the attorneys of Southern Steamship and the NMU. By 7:00
p.m., Southern Steamship's attorney had promised that if the strike were
ended, collective bargaining would begin the following week and shore
passes would be granted. As soon as this information was communicated to
the strikers, they returned to work and at 9:00 p.m. the City of Fort Worth
set sail for Philadelphia. 0 9
According to subsequent findings by the Board, "[t]he officers on
board admitted that the strike did not delay the [ship's] sailing and that the
vessel was in no danger during the period of the strike."' 0 In fact, the
strikers had conceived the strike such that it would not result in violence or
danger to the ship.2 ' Moreover, during the passage to Philadelphia, the
strikers "conducted themselves in a competent manner." The captain had
no complaints to make about them. Other officers admitted that the crew
was "good" and "safe" during the trip. Indeed, one officer proposed to the
"boys" that they "forget all about what happened." Unbeknownst to the
strikers, who nonetheless anticipated trouble, Southern Steamship's
attorney had given them a promise which he had not cleared with either the
company's marine superintendent or its president and which the company
had no intention of fulfilling. Moreover, the captain and his officers were
not inclined to "forget all about" the strike. Before the ship reached
Philadelphia, the ship's officers decided to refuse to re-ship five of the
207. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 33-34 (1940); Transcript of Record at 162-63,436-40, S. S.S. Co.
v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No.320). Warren did not testify; but according to fellow striker John
Pfuhl, Jr., Warren told the captain, "We realize we are under articles, but we are alongside the dock of
an American port, safely moored, and we are on strike, and we have a right to strike." Transcript of
Record, at 220, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
208. Transcript of Record, at 1142-42, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942)(No. 320).
209. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 33-34.
210. Id.at33-34.
211. According to Tracey, the seaman whose actions initiated the strike, "It was to be conducted
very orderly, no violence whatsoever, just tell them what we want [recognition], and if we didn't get it,
we were going to sit down. We were going to keep steam in all of our auxiliaries, and if they put steam
on the deck, we were going to shut down on them, we were not going to give them no steam."
Transcript of Record at 130-31, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
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strikers, which they carried out as soon as the ship arrived on July 25.
Acting on a prior agreement, all but one of the original strikers then struck
the ship in protest; they too were discharged.
212
B. The Southern Steamship Case: From the Board to the Supreme Court
The very next day, July 26, the NMU filed unfair labor practice
charges against Southern Steamship.213 The charges alleged that by
refusing to bargain with the NMU, Southern Steamship violated § 8(5) of
the Wagner Act, that by discharging and refusing to reinstate the strikers, it
violated § 8(3) of the Act, and that by interfering with the workers' right to
organize and bargain collectively the company violated § 8(1) of the Act.214
On November 23, 1938, the NLRB's Regional Director for the Fourth
Region issued a formal complaint based on these charges. In December
1938 and January 1939, several days of hearings were held on these
charges, first in Philadelphia, then in Houston, before a trial examiner. In
February 1939, the trial examiner ruled against Southern Steamship on all
charges and recommended that it be ordered to cease and desist from its
unfair labor practices, that upon application, it reinstate four of the five
seamen215 discharged for their participation in the July 18 strike and offer all
five of them back pay, and that it also reinstate with back pay those
discharged for the July 25 strike.216 Southern Steamship promptly filed
exceptions and the Board granted a full hearing with oral arguments, which
was held on November 2, 1939.
Southern Steamship's arguments before the Board, which would frame
the later litigation of the case, essentially consisted of the following
contentions. First, regarding its refusal to recognize and bargain with the
NMU, Southern Steamship claimed that the NMU had made no demand to
bargain before the July 18 strike, that the strike, because unlawful, negated
any obligation to bargain, and that in any case it had no obligation to
bargain pending a judicial hearing on its earlier objections to the
212. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 34-35 (1940). See also Transcript of Record at 60-85, 150-58,
244, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
213. These charges were amended on November 22, the day before the Board issued a formal
complaint. (The changes mainly added factual information. They did not alter the basic substance of
the ULP claims.)
214. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 27 (1940). These provisions now constitute §§ 8(a)(l), (3), and
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 499 (1935), as amended; 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (1988).
215. The trial examiner agreed with Southern Steamship's contention that the fifth seamen, John
Pfuhl, Jr., was unfit for reinstatment because he was a "slow worker" and had a petty larceny record.
The Board, citing Pfuhl's long and apparently effective service with the company, rejected this
conclusion and ordered that Pfuhl also be offered reinstatement. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 41-42, 44-
45, 47-48.
216. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 28. See also NLRB Aide Backs Ship Crew's Strike, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1939, at S9.
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representation election. Second, regarding the discharges, the company
argued that the discharged seamen's shipping articles, which like most
articles217 expired upon the vessel completing its voyage, terminated the
seamen's employment, so that there could be no claim of unfair discharges.
Third, again regarding the discharges, Southern Steamship argued that the
July 18 strikers engaged in a sit-down strike by which they "took
possession" of the ship, trespassed upon it, and stirred up disobedience
among the crew; by so doing, the company claimed, the strikers forfeited
any right to continued employment. With this, the company clearly hoped
to invoke the rule just announced by the Supreme Court in Fansteel casting
sit-down strikers outside the protection of the labor law.2 18  As to its
discharge of the July 25 strikers, the company raised no clear defense,
although it would subsequently suggest that they had not been discharged
but had simply "voluntarily left the ship" and not returned.219 Finally,
Southern Steamship claimed that the July 18 strikers violated the terms of
their shipping articles, thereby committing a breach of contract that justified
the company's refusal to re-ship them.2
In a unanimous decision released April 23, 1940, the Board rejected
each of these contentions.2  On the issue of recognition, the Board noted
that it had already resolved the representation issue in an earlier decision in
which it emphasized that the company had no right to participate in
representation proceedings. Furthermore, the Board held, the NMU's agent
had made repeated efforts before the City of Fort Worth strike to bargain
with the company.22  Moving to the issues regarding the strikes, the
shipping articles, and the subsequent discharges, the Board, citing an earlier
217. Shipping articles, which are statutorily required of all seamen, may be of two types:
continuous articles, which continue over a definite time period, and voyage articles, which describe a
particular voyage. See NORRIS, supra note 71, at § 6:11. Most seamen in the 1930s, including those
aboard the City of Fort Worth, sailed under voyage articles.
218. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). The Court decided Fansteel on
February 27, 1939.
219. Brief of Petitioner at 6, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320). It is possible that
Southern Steamship also felt that the status of the July 25 strikers was contingent on that of the July 18
strike. This was apparently the Board's view as well. Although it is nowhere entirely clear on this
question, the Board seemed to hold that if the July 18 strike was legal, then the July 25 strike was as
well, and the discharge of the July 25 strikers an unfair labor practice. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 44-45.
In any case, the status of the July 18 strike was throughout the most important question for all involved.
220. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 38-39. Southern Steamship also alleged that it had alternative
reasons, unconnected to the strike, to discharge each of the July 18 strikers. But these reasons were not
taken seriously by the trial examiner (except with respect to one striker, John Pfuhl, Jr.), the Board
(which reversed the trial examiner on that one striker), or the courts. Id. at 40-43; S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB,
120 F.2d 505, 508 (3d Cir. 1941). The matter was not raised by Southern Steamship before the Supreme
Court. See Brief of Petitioner, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320); Transcript of Record
at 68-75, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
221. NLRB Rules Sitting on Deck Not a Sit-Down; Orders Pay for Five Seamen From July, 1938,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1940, at 14.
222. S.S.S.Co.,23NLRBat29-31.
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decision upheld by the Supreme Court, held that the shipping articles did
not conclusively define seamen's tenure of employment. Indeed, it noted
that the City of Fort Worth crew, including all the discharged strikers, had
worked under a clear presumption of continuous employment and that
relative to employment tenure, the articles were therefore an irrelevant
formality.223 The Board was also firm in its view that the July 18 strike was
not illegal. Noting first that the strike was caused by Southern Steamship's
own illegal act, its refusal to bargain, the Board also emphasized that the
strike was not actually a sit-down strike. The July 18 strikers did not seize,
take possession of, or otherwise jeopardize the ship; they were not violent
and were apparently never ordered to leave the ship;224 and in remaining on
board during the strike they were, in a very real sense, simply retiring to
their home. 25 Accordingly, the Board construed the July 18 strike as a
lawful protest of Southern Steamship's continuing unfair labor practice, its
refusal to bargain with the NMU. Likewise, the July 25 strike was a lawful
protest of that unfair labor practice as well as another, the discharge of the
July 18 strikers. 226 Finally, the Board rejected Southern Steamship's breach
of contract argument. The Board acknowledged that the July 18 strike
contravened a covenant of the shipping articles but pointed out that this
would often be the case with any kind of individual employment contracts
and that-consistent with the anti-yellow dog contract provisions of the
Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia acts-such contracts must necessarily yield
on many occasions to a meaningful right to strike. Because the July 18
strike in this case was legal, a contractual promise not to strike would not
control.227
After rejecting all of Southern Steamship's arguments, the Board
upheld the trial examiner's findings that the company had committed
several violations of the law. It held unequivocally that Southern
223. It was customary for Southern Steamship to have its seamen sign new articles at the
conclusion of a voyage at the same time that they signed off on the old articles. Even if for some reason
this did not happen, the seamen considered themselves employed for the next voyage unless specific
notice to the contrary was given. Id. at 36. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's view of this issue in
a very similar case. NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
224. The Board's finding that the strikers were never ordered to leave the ship remained a matter of
minor controversy throughout the litigation. There was some testimony from one of the strikers-
Tracey-that they were asked to leave the ship. Transcript of Record at 140-42, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB,
316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320). No other striker testified to this effect. And Tracey's testimony, while
not overly contradictory, is inconsistent with the other strikers on less controversial issues-including
Warren's response to the Captain's demand to get back to work, which Tracey alone did not recall
occurring. Id. at 138-39. In any case, the Board was not swayed by his reference to the command to
leave the ship.
225. S. S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 37-38.
226. Id. at 34-35, 44-45.
227. Id. at 38-39. The Board's view of the relationship between statutory rights and individual
employment contracts was inherent in depriving yellow dog contracts of any legal effect, which was
clearly a major aim of the Act.
324 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 25:2
Steamship violated § 8(5) of the Wagner Act by its persistent refusal to
recognize and bargain with the NMU. The Board held further that both the
July 18 and July 25 strikes were legal and "protected" within the meaning
of § 7 of the Act. As such, the company's discharges, because motivated by
the workers' participation in those protected strikes, were unfair labor
practices under § 8(1) and (3) of the Act and, along with the § 8(5)
violation, subject to remedy under § 10(c). With only minor alterations, the
Board then upheld the trial examiner's remedies ordering Southern
Steamship to cease and desist from its unfair labor practices, to recognize
and bargain with the NMU, and to reinstate all of the discharged strikers
with back pay-all standard remedies for the unfair labor practices the
company was found to have committed.22 8
In April 1940, Southern Steamship appealed the Board's decision to
the Third Circuit.229 A year later the court issued a ruling on the matter in
which it not only agreed with the Board on every important point, but
substantially followed the Board's reasoning. 30 On the issue that would be
central to the Supreme Court-the legality of the July 18 strike-the court
admitted that the issue was "still an open one," with the law's traditional
prohibition of shipboard strikes running up against an expanding regime of
labor rights from which seamen were not obviously excluded. Other courts,
the majority noted, had recently decided the issue in seemingly conflicting
ways. 3' But upon closer analysis the court discerned a consistent theme in
these cases that clearly supported the Board's decision. While shipboard
strikes that were violent, that involved taking possession of the ship or
otherwise substantially interfering with its operations, that occurred at sea
or in a foreign port, or that otherwise put the ship in jeopardy, had all been
found illegal and unprotected-and in the court's view, quite properly so-
strikes such as the one aboard the City of Fort Worth, which were in every
way different, were treated very differently by the courts.232 Furthermore,
although the court took note of Fansteel, it followed the Board in refusing
to declare the City of Fort Worth strike a sit-down strike within the
meaning of that decision. Instead, it referred to the Fansteel decision only
for the proposition that "[i]f the strikers had been guilty of criminal acts of
violence or of forcible detainer of the vessel" their discharge would be
228. Id. at 44-45. The most important change made by the Board was to order that the fifth
seaman, John Pfuhl, Jr., whom the trial examiner had denied reinstatement because of his alleged
inefficiency, be offered this remedy as well.
229. Transcript of Record at 1-13, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
230. S.S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941).
231. Id. at 510.
232. Id. at 509-11. In particular, the court contrasted the results in Weisthoffv. Am. Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 79 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1935) and Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 875 (2nd Cir. 1938),
with Rees v. United States, 95 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1938) and Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co. v. NLRB
(5th Cir. 1938).
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warranted.233 Inasmuch as the Fansteel strikers had taken control of their
factory for over a week, had held off the police in open combat, and were
eventually convicted of various crimes of violence, this distinction seems
quite apt.234 Further, the court held, if the July 18 strike had indeed taken
place in a manner that imperiled the vessel-for example at sea or in an
"unsafe port"-then perhaps the strike "might well have transcended the
bounds of action in a labor dispute and have constituted a revolt or
mutiny." '235 In the absence of this or any other reason to deem the strike
illegal, the court upheld the Board's unfair labor practice findings as well as
its remedies.
The en bane panel of the Third Circuit that decided Southern
Steamship consisted of five judges, of whom only one dissented. The
dissent is interesting on several points. Judge William Clarke deemed the
decision "untimely in view of present world conditions" (the Second World
War had begun) and a "disservice to wise industrial relations." He went
further and suggested that the right to strike aboard ship should give way to
the right of ship owners "to carry on business," the general need aboard
ship "for discipline at all times," and the real power over their employers
that the shipboard strike gave seamen, as the key reasons it must be
restrained.236
Southern Steamship appealed the Third Circuit's decision to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in October 1941,237 heard oral
arguments on February 9 and 10, 1942, and decided the case on April 6,
1942. Southern Steamship, with the support of the American Merchant
Marine Institute, asked the Court to overturn the Third Circuit's ruling and
set aside the Board's reinstatement and bargaining orders.238  The
company's arguments to the Court closely resembled its arguments before
the Board and the Third Circuit.239 In one major respect, though, its brief
deserves special mention.
The company's brief candidly challenged seamen's right to strike
233. S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 505, 509 (3rd Circuit 1941).
234. On the events that led to the Fansteel decision, see, for example, Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Edward
F. Prichard, Jr., The Fansteel Case: Employee Misconduct and the Remedial Powers of the National
Labor Relations Board, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1289-91 (1939).
235. S. S.S. Co., 120 F.2d at 509.
236. Id. at 511-14.
237. S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 314 U.S. 594 (1941).
238. The National Maritime Institute submitted a short brief that raised essentially the same
arguments as Southern Steamship's brief. Brief of American Merchant Marine Institution, Inc., S. S.S.
Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
239. As below, Southern Steamship argued that the shipping articles must be dispositive of the
seamen's contractual relationship; therefore, the company had not actually discharged any of the
seamen. Moreover, Southern Steamship claimed an unconditional right as employer to observe the
shipboard representation elections and that having been denied this right, it had no obligation to
recognize the NMU. Brief for Petitioner at 27-33, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
326 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 25:2
altogether and did so by invoking a traditional view of shipboard authority.
Appealing to tried and true notions of shipboard paternalism, the company
argued that seamen enjoy a "special relationship" to their "master," one that
"has not materially changed notwithstanding the vast changes in industrial
pursuits on shore."24 As a natural reflection of this relationship, the ship
must be a "disciplined organization." And discipline must be maintained
"at all times wheresoever the ship may be-in port or at sea." '' For this
reason a strike aboard ship could never be countenanced, except possibly in
the vessel's home port.242 Even more remarkably, Southern Steamship
specifically described mutiny law as designed to preserve traditional
authority against the threat of shipboard strikes and the expansion of worker
rights in the workplace generally. 43
The Board, as well as the NMU, which had intervened in the case,
focused their arguments on countering the notion that the strike was
illegal.2" Both took issue with Southern Steamship's paternalistic premise
that seamen are a group deserving this kind of special treatment. In their
briefs, the Board and the NMU pointed out that Congress had every
opportunity to incorporate such an exceptional view of seamen into the
Wagner Act-for example, by excluding them from coverage, as it had
done with several other categories of workers-and obviously declined to
do so.245 This suggested a broad intent to give seamen the same labor rights
as other, shoreside workers.246 Turning to the notion that the July 18
strikers had committed mutiny and that this negated their right to strike, the
respondent parties raised several very plausible arguments. The Board
noted that recent case law revealed a growing reluctance among courts to
treat peaceful, safe shipboard strikes aboard dockside ships as mutinies.247
This contention was advanced with even more force by the NMU, which
observed that every one of the cases cited by Southern Steamship for the
notion that peaceful, dockside shipboard strikes are mutinous---or at least
every one that clearly supported this notion-was not only distinguishable
on the facts but also was an archaic decision decided before labor of any
240. Id. at 12.
241. Id. at 25.
242. Id. at 23-24 & n.21.
243. For good measure, the company also suggested that shipboard strikes would undermine-the
country's vital interest in a strong merchant marine, a matter whose importance was underscored by the
country's entrance into the Second World War. Id. at 9-27.
244. No doubt appreciating the weakness of Southern Steamship's claims on these issues, neither
the Board nor the NMU focused much on the representation question or the shipping articles. Their
arguments essentially repeated those made before the Board and the Third Circuit. Brief of Respondent
at 59-61, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320); Brief of the Nat'l Mar. Union at 13-21, S.
S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
245. Brief for the Nat'l Mar. Union at 42, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
246. See Brief of Respondent at 23-24, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
247. Id. at 41-52.
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kind enjoyed meaningful rights of protest.
248
The Board also observed that while the law once contained provisions
that did seem explicitly to criminalize peaceful, dockside strikes-the
"willful disobedience" provisions of the 1872 Shipping Commissioners
Act-Congress in 1898 had amended these provisions in such a way that
they clearly no longer applied to the strike in question. 49 If Congress had
intended the mutiny law to apply to strikes like the one aboard the City of
Fort Worth, the Board argued, there would have been no need to enact these
provisions of the Shipping Commissioners Act in first place-let alone to
repeal them.2
Litigating in the wake of Fansteel, the Board and the NMU were also
keen to show that the July 18 strike was not a sit-down strike and was not
as a matter of course illegal under that ruling. In their briefs, both
emphasized the points they and the Third Circuit had raised below in
distinguishing this strike from Fansteel: that the strike was non-violent and
did not involve taking possession of the ship; that the ship was never
endangered; that the ship's interests were not substantially prejudiced; and
that the strikers were never even ordered to leave the ship. 1 Indeed, as the
Board's brief was especially concerned to underscore, the real issue in
Fansteel had little to do with the workers sitting down as such and instead
involved the "illegal seizure and retention of the plant by force and violence
and the refusal of the strikers to permit the owner to enter its property.
2 52
In essence, both the union and the Board argued, all that the City of Fort
Worth strikers did was refuse to work at a time not critical to the well-being
of the ship or its crew; and rather than sitting down on the job, let alone
seizing control of the workplace, what they really did was tantamount
simply to staying home.253 On the other hand, they noted that if such a
strike was illegal under the mutiny law, and if Southern Steamship's
argument that the shipping articles alone determine tenure of employment
248. Brief for the Nat'l Mar. Union at 26-40, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
249. Section 51 of the Shipping Commissioners Act had created several crimes of "willful
disobedience," including one that specifically referred to willful disobedience by "combining with
others." See supra note 40. The Maguire Act of 1898 eliminated the last of these altogether and
amended the other provisions such that they applied only to conduct occurring "at sea." Brief of
Respondent at 28-29, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
250. Brief of Respondent at 36-38, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320). The Board
also noted that § 20 of the Clayton Act seemed to express the intent by Congress that mutiny law not be
applied in labor disputes in the first place. Id. at 36 & n.2 1.
251. Id. at 9-21, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320); Brief for the Nat'l Mar.
Union at 22-28, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
252. Brief of Respondent at 20, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
253. Indeed, the Board pointed out that had the seamen left the ship they would have committed the
offense of desertion and that Southern Steamship had conceded this would have been far worse for its
interests than the strike. Id. at 21 & n.12.
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prevailed, seamen would be left with no meaningful right to strike at all. 4
Moreover, even if the strike was illegal under Fansteel or the mutiny
statute, the issue here was whether it was nonetheless protected-and
technical or minor violations of the law need not be taken to cause strikers
to forfeit their rights under the labor law. 55
The Supreme Court decided Southern Steamship by a five-to-four
vote, with the majority opinion written by Justice James Byrnes, a Franklin
D. Roosevelt appointee from South Carolina who served only one term on
the Court.256 Byrnes began his opinion by summarily rejecting Southern
Steamship's argument that it had a right to be present during voting and that
the denial of that right vitiated the election results. He just as quickly
dispensed with the company's claim that the shipping articles established
the seamen's tenure of employment. On each point, Byrnes refused to set
aside the Board's and the Third Circuit's rulings. 7 Indeed for Byrnes, the
only real question was whether the Board had exceeded it remedial
authority under § 10(c) in ordering the reinstatement of the July 18 strikers.
As Byrnes understood the case, reaching an answer to this question required
the Court to determine first, whether the strike was legal and protected
under § 7, and second, whether the discharges were therefore violations of §
8(1) and (3).
Byrnes began his analysis of that issue by expressing a view of seamen
that might have come straight from Justice Story a century earlier and that
left little doubt as to the way the Court would rule.
Ever since men have gone to sea, the relationship of master to seamen has
been entirely different from that of employer to employee on land. The
lives of passengers and crew, as well as the safety of ship and cargo, are
entrusted to the master's care. Every one and every thing depend on him.
He must command and the crew must obey.258
For Byrnes, as for Story and indeed many other Nineteenth Century
jurists, this obligation to obey was justified by the fundamentally
paternalistic notion that "workers at sea have been the beneficiaries of
extraordinary legislative solicitude, undoubtedly prompted by the limits
upon their ability to help themselves., 259 "It is in this setting of fact and
law," he continued, "that we must test the validity of the Board's order of
254. Brief of the Nat'l Mar. Union at 21-22, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
255. Brief of Respondent at 52-58, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
256. Byrnes, who served only a year on the court (from October 1941 to October 1942), is little
known as a Justice. Before taking a seat on the Court he was a Congressman and then Senator from
South Carolina. After leaving the court he served as Director of Economic Stabilization and Director of
War Mobilization under Roosevelt, Secretary of State under Truman, and, finally, Governor of South
Carolina. See DAVID ROBERTSON, SLY AND ABLE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES BYRNES (1994).
257. S.S.S.Co.,316U.S.at 37-38.
258. Id. at 38.
259. Id. at 39.
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reinstatement." 6 ' That part of this "extraordinary legislative solicitude"
might include the Wagner Act, which was being flouted by Southern
Steamship in this very case, was of no apparent concern to the Justice.
Neither was the fact that the ability of seamen to "help themselves" under
the Wagner Act was precisely the issue at hand.
Byrnes turned from here straight to the question of mutiny and
promptly concluded that the strike aboard the City of Fort Worth on July 18
constituted both mutiny as such as well as conspiracy to commit mutiny.
Again begging a key question, Byrnes concluded that "[I]t may hardly be
disputed that each of the strikers resisted the captain and other officers in
the free and lawful exercise of their authority and command, within the
meaning of § 293, or that they combined and conspired to that end, within
the meaning of § 292. ' '26I In his view, the strikers "undertook to impose
their will on the captain and officers.'2 6 2 And while he acknowledged that
the strike may not have been violent or otherwise interfered with the ship's
functions, he saw no grounds to draw a distinction along these lines. The
strike prevented the ship from sailing, and this was sufficient.263
Citing the Board's concession that if the strike had taken place on the
high seas it would no doubt be mutinous, Byrnes allowed his analysis of the
mutiny question to focus on only one additional issue: the propriety of
distinguishing between a shipboard strike such as this one, and other
situations already deemed by the courts mutinous.2' Although Byrnes cited
a number of Nineteenth Century cases (including several authored by
Story), as well as two Twentieth Century cases, for the proposition that
shipboard strikes on the high seas, "in harbor," or in foreign jurisdictions
were properly deemed mutinous, he admitted that no authority spoke to the
issue of a strike on a ship tied to the dock in domestic waters.265 In order to
contend with this ambiguity, he then pointed to recent, unsuccessful
attempts to amend the mutiny statutes that they might clearly permit
shipboard strikes as evidence of prevailing legislative purpose.266 Finally,
summoning up various speculative scenarios, Byrnes argued that a ship is
never safe, even in port, and that therefore the same considerations that
rendered at-sea strikes mutinous should also apply to in-port strikes. 267 For
260. Id.
261. Id. at 40.
262. Id. at 41.
263. Id. at 40-41.
264. Id. at41.
265. Id. at 42 & n.14.
266. Id. at 43-44. The bills to which Byrnes refers, H.R. 3427, 76"' Cong. I' Session (1939) and
H.R. 3428, 76th Cong. 1 Sess. (1939), were not introduced until January 30, 1939. 84 CONG. REC. H967
(1939).
267. Id. at 46. Byrnes argued that "it is by no means clear that a ship moored to a dock is "safe" if
its crew refuses to tend it."
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Byrnes, these were more than sufficient reasons to hold that all shipboard
strikes, except perhaps those occurring in the vessel's home port, are
mutinous and illegal.
There remained the Board's alternative argument that even if the strike
were mutinous, it should still be protected by § 7 and the discharges subject
to Board remedy. The Board had raised two interconnected reasons to
support this position: first, that the employer had engaged in a serious unfair
labor practice; and second, that the mutiny, if one existed at all, was merely
"technical." To the first reason, Bymes responded that, "the Board has not
been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so
single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important
Congressional objectives." '268 The Board, he continued, had undertaken
what must be a "careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to
another" in an incorrect way; it had placed "excessive emphasis on its
immediate task." '269 To the Board's second reason, which referenced the
strike's placid, unthreatening nature, Byrnes again speculated widely as to
the possible dangers posed by the strike. He suggested that the strike's lack
of violence was but a "fortunate feature of the affair" and that "as a
practical matter, the City of Fort Worth was definitely wrested from the
control of its officers."27 Indeed, Byrnes not only rejected the idea that
strikes should remain protected when merely technically violating other
laws, he actually held that where the Board's use of its remedial power
impinged on any other federal statute or policy which the Board itself-in
the Court's view-had insufficient expertise to interpret, the Board's
remedial power must yield completely. 7'
As a final matter, Bymes attempted to address the concern so clearly
raised by the NMU that the majority's ruling would deprive seamen of any
real right to strike. Articulating one of Southern Steamship's more
important themes, Bymes steered the seamen away from the strike to the
courts. He proposed that "[a]t any time following the certification of the
NMU in January, 1938, the union and the Board could have secured the
assistance of the courts in forcing petitioner to bargain." Had the union
done this, he surmised, the "unfortunate occurrence at Houston might have
been averted." '272
Justice Stanley Reed authored a brief dissent, in which he was joined
by Justices Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy.273
268. Id. at 47.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 47.
271. Id. at48-49.
272. Id.
273. As Governor of Michigan, Frank Murphy had refused to evict the United Auto Workers' sit-
down strikers, thus assuring their momentous victory over General Motors Corporation. On Murphy's
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Perhaps the most notable feature of Reed's dissent is that it does not
challenge the majority's view that the strike was an act of mutiny. Instead
Reed assumed this to be true and focused his entire argument on criticizing
the majority's notion that such an unlawful act negates the Board's remedial
authority. By so ruling, he argued, the majority "unduly expands judicial
review of the Board's discretionary power. '  To bolster this point, Reed
also emphasized that Fansteel was concerned with violent seizure of the
plant, not with a peaceful, non-possessory strike; it dealt with a serious
criminal act of which strikers were actually convicted, not a technical
violation of the law that featured no attempt at prosecution. For that reason,
there was "no justification for an iron rule that a discharge of a striker by
his employer for some particular, unlawful conduct in furtherance of a
strike is sufficient to bar his reinstatement as a matter of law." '275
C. Critiquing the Supreme Court's Decision
The majority's decision in Southern Steamship rests on rather
questionable legal grounds, only one or two of which are mentioned by the
dissent. Perhaps the most important shortcoming in the Court's reasoning
is its determination that mutiny law continued to apply in this case as it did
in the Nineteenth Century, unchanged by the Wagner Act. In reaching this
conclusion, on which depended the characterization of the strike as illegal,
the Court discounted completely the dramatic changes in labor policy that
had occurred since the interpretation of mutiny law that it cited was
established. As was noted not only by the Board and the NMU, but also by
several commentators in the late 1930s who anticipated this issue, when the
law of mutiny was developed along these lines, so favored by Justice
Byrnes, it was essentially illegal for all industrial workers to organize
unions, to demand collective bargaining, or to strike.276 The Wagner Act, as
well as the Norris-LaGuardia and Lafollette acts, had transformed the law
in this area, suggesting the need to re-conceptualize and subordinate mutiny
law, not labor law. At the same time, as the Court itself admitted, the
application of mutiny law to a strike such as the one aboard the City of Fort
Worth had not been endorsed by appellate courts.277 In combination, these
points call very much for the subordination of mutiny law to labor law, not
vice versa.
A similar point can be made about the obsolescence of the Court's
role in the sit-down strikes, see, for example, James Wolfinger, The Strange Career of Frank Murphy:
Conservatives, State-Level Politics, and the End of the New Deal, 65 HISTORIAN 377 (2002); J.
Woodward Howard Jr., Frank Murphy and the Sit-Down Strikes of 1937, 1 LAB. HIST. 103 (1960).
274. S.S.S.Co.,316U.S.at50-51.
275. Id.at51.
276. See Saprio & Franks, supra note 173, at 44.
277. S.S.S. Co.,316U.S. at42.
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view of contract. While the Court did not allow the shipping articles to
determine the tenure of employment question, it did specifically rest its
determination that the strike was mutinous, and therefore unprotected, on
the promise made by the seamen in the articles to obey lawful commands.27 8
In so doing, the Court in effect construed the articles as a waiver, by
individual contract, of the right to strike. This, which the Board had
criticized in its brief, is problematic in at least two ways. For one thing, §
8(3) of the Wagner Act on its face outlaws yellow dog contracts-precisely
because such contracts are inconsistent with the meaningful exercise of
labor rights.279 For another, this use of the articles seems to have also
violated § 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which specifically prohibits
federal courts to rely on any contractual promise not to join a labor union or
not to strike as a "basis for granting legal or equitable relief.
280
A related problem with the Court's reasoning is that it did not invoke
anything resembling a traditional rule for constructing conflicting statutes.
The only thing in the way of statutory construction in Byrnes' opinion is the
reference to an unsuccessful effort in Congress to amend the mutiny law to
specifically allow dockside strikes. For Byrnes the failure of this
legislation-which was proposed, in 1939, after the Southern Steamship
controversy commenced, and which sought to craft a broader exception
than the one at issue in this case-tended to prove Congressional intent to
prohibit all shipboard strikes.28" ' This exercise, though, did not confront the
obvious, facial conflict between mutiny law and the labor law. If the
seamen's conduct was indeed mutinous as the Court believed, it was also,
without question within the apparent protections of § 7 and § 8 of the
Wagner Act. And the general rule for interpreting such conflicting
statutes-that in the absence of clear legislative intent (which was certainly
true in this case), the latter of two conflicting statutes should prevail-
would clearly have supported the Board's position. Of course, this doctrine
should apply only when the statutes are in actual conflict; but it seems this
is precisely what the Court thought to be the case.
Even if the Court were correct in its view that mutiny law had
278. Id. at 38-39.
279. Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act provides, in relevant part, that it shall constitute an unfair
labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
Wagner Act, ch. 372,§ 8, 49 Stat. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a)(3), as amended. The Board's view
of the Wagner Act on this issue would be authorized by the Supreme Court one year later in a case
involving the relationship between individual contracts and union representation. J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
280. Section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 103, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
281. S. S.S. Co., 316 U.S. at 43-44. The opinion refers to Sections 292 and 293 of the federal
mutiny statutes, as originally enacted in 1835 and amended in 1909. Act of March 3, 1835, ch.40, § 1, 4
Stat. 775, 776; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 292-293, 35 Stat. 1088, 1146 (1909).
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remained unchanged and that the strikers were in effect mutineers, it is not
at all clear that this fact alone justified denying the Board the power to
remedy the strike. This was the dissent's major argument and it is one the
majority hardly acknowledges. In fact, this issue once again presented the
Court with a conflict between the mutiny law and the labor law. And once
again, the Court was satisfied simply to subordinate the terms and policies
of the Wagner Act, passed by Congress only seven years before, to archaic
judicial interpretations of a vague statute enacted exactly 100 years before
the Wagner Act. 282 Even more problematic is that it rendered this as a
general rule that labor law should never be enforced in a way that conflicts
with other federal statutes or policies.
It is also critical to note in this connection that the accommodation
sought by the Board did not in the Board's view foreclose application of the
mutiny law. The Board specifically recognized a scenario under which
mutiny law would remain available to punish the seamen-who in this case,
it should be noted, were not even charged-at the same time that the
employer remained liable for its unfair labor practices. From this vantage,
it is not at all clear that a genuine conflict actually existed between mutiny
law and labor law in the first place-much less a conflict requiring
subordination of labor law. It is not clear either that what the Board
proposed to do in this connection actually involved a derogatory
"construction" of the mutiny statute so much as an acknowledgement of its
significance.
Another difficulty with the Court's decision inheres in its attempt to
identify this case with Fansteel. This maneuver, which is implicit in
Bymes' view of Southern Steamship as an appropriate extension of
Fansteel, is unfounded. The Court does not really engage arguments by the
Board, the NMU, and (to some extent) the dissenting justices that tend to
distinguish the City of Fort Worth strike in a fundamental way from the true
sit-down strike in Fansteel and the unique concerns raised by that strike.
The ship, unlike the Fansteel factory, was without any doubt the crew's
home. The crew of the City of Fort Worth, unlike the Fansteel strikers,
engaged in no violence, made no attempt to seize the ship or displace the
captain, did not defy orders in remaining aboard, and were never actually
charged with, let alone convicted of, any crimes at all. By the same token,
the Fansteel majority had been careful to avoid holding that any unlawful
conduct would prevent the Board from remedying a discharge, particularly
where the underlying strike was motivated by the employer's unfair labor
practices." 3 The Southern Steamship majority was not so discerning.
282. The mutiny statute that prevails over the Wagner Act in the Court's analysis was enacted in
1835. Act of Mar. 3, 1835, ch. 40, § 1, 4 Stat. 775, 775. Minor amendments were made in 1909. Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 292-293, 35 Stat. 1088, 1146 (1909).
283. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255-56 (1939). Before Southern
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Moreover, while Fansteel focused on the unlawfulness of the sit-down
strike as part of a broader analysis of its unprotectedness-one attuned to
the strike's violence and the like-the Southern Steamship Court took
unlawfulness as such, combined with a brief speculation on the risks of
such strikes, as a sufficient basis to leave the strikers unprotected.
Even to the extent that couching Southern Steamship in the logic of
Fansteel was appropriate, this only raised the larger question whether
Fansteel itself was rightly decided. The most trenchant critique of that
decision remains one offered in 1939 by Henry Hart and Edward
Prichard."5 4 In Fansteel as in Southern Steamship the primary cause of the
strike was the employer's violation of § 8(5): its refusal to bargain with a
union that enjoyed representative status. The Fansteel Court, per Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, recognized this as "reprehensible" conduct, but
nonetheless upheld the employer's property rights and deferred to the
general virtues of law and order.285 This, in turn, cast the strike as illegal
and unprotected, and put the discharges of the strikers beyond the power of
the Board to remedy. For Hart and Prichard, the main defect in this
reasoning was its short-sighted, overly formalistic, and altogether
unrealistic view of the Act's aims. The Court's reasoning, they observed,
converts the actual problem of the effect of misconduct as a qualification
upon the Board's remedial power to correct actual wrongs by employers
into a hypothetical problem of the employer's punitive power to obtain
redress for hypothetical wrongs by employees. The Court's approach omits
from consideration the provocation to the employees. It omits from
consideration the effect of reinstatement upon the future of collective
bargaining in the plant. It omits from consideration, finally, the importance
of discouraging unfair labor practices which is the prime function of the
Act.
28 6
In these respects, Fansteel, in the guise of discouraging serious labor
unrest, actually left unremedied the very causes of such unrest and
unfulfilled the Wagner Act's main purpose: to rely on the prospect of a
strike as a way of compelling collective bargaining. On the other hand, had
the Court allowed the Board's remedies to stand, the Fansteel employer
would have "felt the full deterrent effect of the federal remedies provided
for violation of federal law." By this route, the Wagner Act's aims would
Steamship was decided, lower courts had been quick to draw on this limiting language to avoid
overturning Board reinstatement orders in cases involving violent conduct by strikers. This was
particularly true of the Third Circuit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.
1939) (fist-fighting striker); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472 (3rd Cir. 1939) (multiple,
mainly minor, acts of violence and other criminal behavior); NLRB v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F.2d
221 (3d Cir. 1940) (throwing stones).
284. See generally, Hart & Prichard, supra note 234.
285. Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 253.
286. Hart & Prichard, supra note 234, at 1316.
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have been better achieved and any serious misconduct could still be dealt
with by the criminal law. 87
For reasons we have already touched on, the very same criticisms can
made with even more effect of Southern Steamship. Like the strike in
Fansteel, the Southern Steamship strike was in protest of an egregious
unfair labor practice that struck at the heart of the Wagner Act's legislative
agenda. Having unsuccessfully appealed to their employer and then taken
equally unsuccessful steps to enforce their right to recognition and
collective bargaining before the Board, the seamen resorted to a logical and
effective fall back. And unlike the Fansteel strikers, they conducted
themselves in an altogether non-threatening, non-violent fashion. Still the
Court found their actions unprotected and beyond the Board's remedial
powers. In so doing, it seriously weakened the Board's ability to enforce
the Act and dramatically diminished the Act's meaning for workers.
VI.
SOUTHERN STEAMSHIP'S TRANSFORMATION OF THE WAGNER ACT
At the outset of this Article, I quoted Karl Klare's insight that by its
interpretations of the Wagner Act, the Late New Deal Court "shap[ed] the
ideological and institutional architecture of the modem capitalist
workplace." '88 This is as true of Southern Steamship as it is of Fansteel,
NLRB v. Mackay Radio,289or any other labor decisions of the Late New Deal
Court. For Southern Steamship transformed the labor law in very important
ways. In some respects, this transformation involved the labor rights of
seamen and Southern Steamship's dramatic limitation of those workers'
rights under the law. In other respects, Southern Steamship also limited the
labor rights of workers in general-and with this the broad meaning of the
Wagner Act. In either case, these transformations, which may be described
in both jurisprudential and doctrinal terms, lend Southern Steamship a
significance that far transcends the matter of whether it was wrongly
decided on simple doctrinal grounds. Even if it were simply a close case
that was plausibly decided-and I believe this is the very best that can be
said of it-Southern Steamship must be understood critically for its effect
on the labor law.
A. Southern Steamship in Historical Context
It must be said that to describe Southern Steamship in these ways does
not imply an attempt to explain all the forces that influenced the Court's
287. Id. at 1320.
288. Klare, supra note 2, at 291-92.
289. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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decision. That aspiration lies well beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, a few remarks are appropriate. On this point, I have already
disclaimed any attempt to couch the decision in the personalities of the
justices. It is useful, though, to situate Southern Steamship in its economic
and political context, if only to expose the substructure of its jurisprudence.
Southern Steamship was decided in the first year of the United States'
formal involvement in the Second World War. No doubt anxieties
generated by the war influenced the Court's decision. This seems
particularly likely given, if I may retreat for a moment from my earlier
injunction, Byrnes well-documented militarism.29 What can be doubted,
though, is whether such anxieties were well founded in this case. The war
did not suspend class conflicts, as is sometimes falsely assumed. But the
NMU, whose members died by the hundreds aboard ship during the war,
earnestly pledged itself to avoid wartime strikes and otherwise to support
the war effort-in fact, it did so even before direct American involvement
in the war commenced.291
Southern Steamship was also decided amidst a larger shift to the
political right that characterized the federal government's economic policy
of the late 1930s and early 1940s-a shift that reflected a number of factors,
including the continued strength of the business lobby, the resiliency of the
AFL, and the instability of the New Deal coalition. This may be seen as
consistent with the overall consolidation of a corporate Keynesian agenda-
and the development of a regime of labor relations consistent with this
agenda-that marked the late New Deal. Indeed by the time Southern
Steamship was decided, it was not clear that the New Deal as such remained
a defining political experience at all, having been overtaken by the Second
World War. In this light, it is not so surprising that the Court, which in the
late 1942 had only just abandoned its outright opposition to the New Deal,
would find it desirable to take an unsympathetic attitude towards the labor
movement's CIO-led push to the left, towards a Board that seemed unduly
activist and pro-labor, and towards the kind of labor militancy represented
by the Southern Steamship strike.292
290. Bymes, who, as Secretary of State, played a key role in encouraging Harry Truman to drop the
atomic bombs on Japan, was also an early proponent of aggressive Cold War policies. On this point,
see, for example, ROBERT L. MESSER, THE END OF AN ALLIANCE: JAMES F. BYRNES, ROOSEVELT,
TRUMAN, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR (1982), pp. 105-107, 188-194. For what it is worth,
Byrnes was also a proponent of racial segregation. Thomas S. Morgan, James F. Byrnes and the
Politics of Segregation, 56 HISTORIAN 644, 655 (1994).
291. See, e.g., C.1O. Backs Foreign Policy in Rout of the Lewis Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1941, at 1; No-Strike Pledge Voted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1944, at 36 (CIO unions, the NMJ included,
re-affirming no-strike pledge); NMU Reaffirms 'No Strikes', N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1945, at 24.
292. On the rightward trend in late New Deal labor policies and the forces behind this development,
see, for example, JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD:
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947 (1981).
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B. Southern Steamship and the Rights of Shipboard Labor
For seamen, Southern Steamship's key implication was its affirmation
of the view that they remained a "special" class of workers, still subject to
the paternalistic logic of Nineteenth Century labor relations, rather than the
New Deal's much more modem regime. 93 Practically, this meant that
seamen would have no meaningful right to strike at all. The Court did
suggest that seamen could still strike aboard ship in the vessel's home
port-and this has become the clear legal rule on the matter. 94 But this
exception did not and could not amount to much. For one thing, there is
every reason to think that under Southern Steamship, even in the ship's
home port, its captain could simply order the strikers to either work or get
off the ship and then discharge them as trespassers if they refused.
Likewise, while Southern Steamship did not limit the right of seamen to
strike on the dock, such a strike, if undertaken during the period that the
shipping articles were in effect would appear under the Court's view of the
shipping articles and their relationship to the Wagner Act to constitute
desertion, for which offense the seamen would forfeit their wages and
effects and presumably render themselves subject to discharge just as if
they had mutinied.2 95 In any case, such a dockside strike could not prevent
the ship's owners simply replacing the crew within its rights under Mackay
Radio-temporarily, if their strike was in protest of an unfair labor practice;
permanently, if their strike was motivated by anything else.2 96 The Court, it
will be recalled, also urged seamen to take their issue to the courts in lieu of
striking. But aside from proposing a manifestly less effective approach to
dealing with recalcitrant employers, this advice merely begged the question
whether seamen could or should enjoy the right to militant protest at the
point of production in the first place.
As we shall see, the practical effects of these changes have been
significant. Not least, they have left American seamen with few ways to
mount effective protests to the steady erosion of their numbers by the
combined force of labor-saving technologies and owners' resort to foreign
293. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 837 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1988) (Because of the
unique nature of shipboard service and the threat of mutiny, the Board may not order a remedy of the
discharge of a radio operator for refusing to reveal to the captain the nature of his communication from
the ship with the NLRB).
294. See, e.g., In the Matter of License No. 164172 and Merchant Mariner's Document No. Z-
226580, Issued to: Richard Klattenberg, Chief Engineer, Decision of the Commandant, United States
Coast Guard, March 12, 1958 (upholding suspension of licenses for engineers' shipboard strike).
295. See, e.g., Madden v. Lykes Bros. Ripley S.S. Co., 110 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 690; Clayton v. Standard Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Tex. 1941); Monroe v. Hernande, 277
F. 800 (4th Cir. 1921). See also Crew Strike Forces Queen ofBernuda to Sail Without 560 Passengers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1955, at I (threat of desertion charges prevented ship's engineers from joining the
strike).
296. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel, Co., 304 U.S. 333,345-46 (1938).
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crews serving on ships registered in foreign countries. Just as importantly,
by limiting their right to engage in direct action, these changes have also
deprived seamen of the ability to embrace the kind of militancy that seems
essential to maintaining labor's organizational vitality.
C. Southern Steamship and the Rights of Labor Generally
Southern Steamship's implications were not limited to seamen. The
Court limited the Wagner Act in broader ways, too, which would affect its
meaning for all workers. Some of these implications are rather general and
may be mentioned briefly. For example, key to Southern Steamship's
reasoning is a broad affirmation of traditional notions of private property
and contract against the Wagner Act's more reformist tendencies. The
Court's appeal to private property is oblique. The Court implied that had
the strikers refused a command to disembark the ship, the strike's illegality
would have been obvious.297 With this, the Court totally rejected the view,
which was consistent with the Wagner Act, but already called into serious
question by Fansteel, that the Wagner Act required any real compromise of
employer's private property rights to effectuate the right to strike--even a
strike in protest of an employer's unfair labor practices. Indeed, in many
ways Southern Steamship makes the point more clearly than Fansteel, as
the Southern Steamship Court elevated private property over the right to
strike not only where strike was motivated by a serious unfair labor
practice, but in a peaceful, almost risk-free context, where the workplace
doubled as the strikers' home, and where quitting the ship would have
exposed the workers to quasi-criminal desertion charges. With this, the
Court affirmed an inflexible view of private property of the sort that had
formed the doctrinal mainstay of anti-labor jurisprudence in the pre-
Wagner Act world, and that would gradually limit § 7 rights through the
second half of the Twentieth Century.298
The Court's appeal to contract is more direct. Although the Court did
not find the shipping articles dispositive of the seamen's tenure of
297. Byrnes makes much, for example, of the prospect that the strikers may not have voluntarily
left the vessel if explicitly ordered to do so. "It is difficult to imagine they would have surrendered their
jobs and their quarters without a struggle." S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 34, 48 (1942).
298. As the law stands today, workers are presumptively without any right to strike on an
employer's private property. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 202 (1978). Only in exceptional circumstances where workers lack viable
alternatives and impingement of an employer's private property rights are minimal (e.g., shopping
malls) do workers have any hope of gaining access to private property for this purpose. And even there,
the Court seems to have imposed even more restraints. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)
(denying access to private property to non-employee organizers despite a lack of public property or
alternative means to communicate with workers). On the relationship between private property
jurisprudence and rights under the labor law, see, for example, Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and
Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994).
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employment, it did invoke the crew's implicit promise in the articles not to
strike. As I mention above, this seems to have constituted the enforcement
of yellow dog contracts in apparent violation of both the Wagner Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It also affirmed in a general way the authority
of contract to limit the right to strike. For while the shipping articles and
limits on the right to strike that run with them are limited to seafaring labor,
the logic behind the Court's view of their proper relationship is not. The
Board and the NMU, it may be recalled, did not ask that the articles be
rendered completely irrelevant, only that their effect be qualified on this
issue. In refusing to do this, the Court demonstrated a commitment to the
sanctity of contract over the rights of labor protest that would resurface in
other contexts.299
Another very important respect in which Southern Steamship affected
the rights of all workers concerns its view that the shipboard strike was
unprotected because it was "unlawful." As mentioned above, Southern
Steamship articulated a general view that the unlawfulness of a strike, rather
than its substance or context, determined its protectedness. To be sure, the
unlawful character of the sit-down strike had been a concern of the Court in
Fansteel.°° But on this issue, Southern Steamship went well beyond
Fansteel. The Court in Fansteel, it may be recalled, denied the Board's
power to reinstate the sit-down strikers not simply because they acted
unlawfully in the abstract-committed trespass and various assaults-but
because of the great violence and the overt seizure of property evident in
these unlawful acts. In other words, the Fansteel Court focused on the
unlawful character of the sit-down strike only in the course of a broader
analysis of the nature of the strikers' violence and the magnitude of their
affront to the employer's private property rights.3"' For the Court in
Southern Steamship, however, the mutinous character of the seamen's strike
rendered it unprotected not because of what that mutiny actually constituted
299. While shipping articles remain the only individual employment contracts that limit employees'
fundamental rights under the Act, the Taft-Hartley Act and subsequent courts would pursue this
contractarian theme with respect to collective bargaining agreements to the point that contract has come
to dramatically limit the right to strike for most workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.
Under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements are generally
enforceable against labor unions and may be enforced by damages and injunctive relief. Labor-
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (West 2004). Even more notably, the Court gradually
developed a set of doctrines by which an agreement not to strike may be inferred from the existence of
an arbitration clause on the matter and enforced against a union by injunction if necessary-even where
a no-strike clause is totally absent from the collective bargaining agreement. The key cases on this
point are Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), where the Court held generally
that an agreement not to strike over an issues is implied by the existence of an arbitration clause, and
Boys Markets. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), where the Court authorized
the use of injunctions to enforce such implied provisions.
300. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939).
301. Id. at 252-53.
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in this case-for example, that it was manifestly violent or unsafe, which it
of course it was not-but rather because mutiny is unlawful and unlawful
strikes are necessarily beyond the statute's protections.3 2
This determination, that unlawfulness equals unprotectedness, features
a number of problems. For one thing, this position rests on a peculiar, and
problematic, jurisprudential orientation. It does not go without saying that
the putative unlawfulness of the strike should control the issue in lieu of the
kind of contextual analysis proposed by the Board and consistent with
Fansteel. As Hart and Prichard's analysis of Fansteel suggests, even the
slightest concern for realist-let alone radical-considerations would have
mandated precisely such a contextual approach. Indeed, as noted above, the
Board's view was, very reasonably, that the strike could be protected at the
same time that the mutiny law remained available to enforce. This seems
all the more apt, given that even if mutinous, the strike hardly constituted a
serious crime; but the employer's conduct was clearly an egregious
violation of the labor law and by the Court's own admission, contrary to the
most fundamental aim of the Wagner Act.
In a somewhat similar way, it is not at all obvious what "unlawfulness"
means or what significance should follow from this. Does unlawfulness
contemplate, for example, a conviction for mutiny or, alternatively, a formal
charge, which are both lacking in this case? Does it contemplate the
Board's view? Or, does it contemplate the Supreme Court's distant
application of the facts combined with an at best tenuous interpretation of
mutiny law? Ultimately the concept can mean any number of things and
the Court itself actually does very little to clarify the matter other than to
impose its own view over that of the Board. In fact, as this very case also
well illustrates, the law-and with this the meaning of unlawfulness-has a
deeply contingent meaning which is dependent on precisely the kinds of
contextual analysis that the Board is so much better suited than any court to
perform. The Board's interpretation of the law and the facts was at least as
reasonable as the Court's, and considerably more grounded in the
peculiarities of this dispute.
Finally, this notion of unlawfulness inevitably compromises only the
labor law. To say that unlawfulness describes the limits of Board authority
and § 7 protections must actually mean that the Wagner Act must yield to
other laws-and never the opposite nor any attempt at compromise.
Indeed, the Court was careful to note this is exactly what it means: the
Board's authority and the Act's protections must yield where they come
into conflict with any other federal statutes or policies.
Perhaps sensing some of the difficulties, Byrnes tries, in a rather
302. As Byrnes puts it: "We cannot ignore the fact that the strike was unlawful from its very
inception." S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31,48 (1942) (Byrnes, J.).
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dubious way, to bolster his argument. Bymes does not simply cite mutiny's
unlawfulness; he attempts to discern, in the crime of mutiny, inherent and
intolerable risks, such that even this strike, the mildest possible expression
of mutiny, must go unprotected. The ship might meet with disaster; the
captain's authority might be undermined; the strike might become violent.0 3
All of this is true, but at the same time so utterly speculative that it could be
said of virtually any strike. By invoking such risks, Byrnes reveals his
commitment to a particular kind of formalist bias: that the law, as defined
by the courts, provides a legitimate indicator of acceptable levels of social
risks and, overall, a legitimate index of acceptable social order. Just as
problematically, this speculative appeal to risks conjures up a key theme in
pre-New Deal labor jurisprudence-the theme on which the most notorious
exercises in anti-labor judicial activism were based. 4
This doctrine, with its intensely derogatory view of labor law and labor
policy, has become an important precedent of Southern Steamship. Courts
have relied on it, in lieu of any other method for reconciling conflicting
statutes, to subordinate labor law and labor policy to other statutes and the
polices that these statutes represent. In some cases, this logic has been
applied with respect to conflicts involving strike activity. In particular,
Southern Steamship has been called on by lower courts to deny the Board
the power to reinstate workers simply because they had used vulgar or
profane language or had engaged in relatively minor acts of picket-line
violence, even where no criminal convictions were ever obtained.3"5 In
other cases, this logic has been applied more broadly. Southern Steamship
has been invoked to preclude Board remedies that in the view of courts,
impinge on the Interstate Commerce Act, antitrust law, bankruptcy law, the
Davis-Bacon Act, as well as foreign affairs.30 6
303. Id. at 45-48.
304. Speculative appeals to the risks that supposedly inhered in labor protests are fundamental to
the reasoning of a number of infamous labor injunction cases. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492,
(1900); Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, (1896).
305. NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1966) (strikers' minor damage to
property, verbal abuse and heckling, and "lying down in front of a moving truck" disentitle them to
Board remedy); NLRB v. Longview Furniture, 206 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953) (employees use of vulgar
and profane language was a basis on which to deny reinstatement); NLRB v. Kelco Corp., 178 F.2d 578
(4th Cir. 1949) (assault, even without conviction, must be considered by the Board before it orders
reinstatement). The Board and the courts subsequently developed specific rules for determining the
limits of the Board's remedial authority in cases involving "misconduct" by strikers-rules that refer
more often to the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act than to Southern Steamship. The case
continues to be cited for this proposition. See Clear Pine Mouldings Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984).
Cf NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954). See also Albin Renauer, Note, Reinstatement of
Unfair Labor Practice Strikers Who Engage in Strike-Related Misconduct: Repudiation of the Thayer
Doctrine by Clear Pine Mouldings, 8 INDUS. REL. L. J. 226, 235-36 (1986).
306. See United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (Interstate
Commerce Act); Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
(antitrust); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (bankruptcy); Can-Am Plumbing, Inc. v.
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To be sure, for a long time other courts and the Board were not always
inclined to follow this implication of Southern Steamship too strictly.0 7
That may well be changing, though. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v.
NLRB, decided in 2002, the Court called on Southern Steamship to limit the
protections of the labor law to undocumented alien workers.30 8 In Hoffinan
Plastic, the Court took up the question whether the Board could order an
employer to pay back pay to an undocumented worker under any
circumstances. Relying primarily on Southern Steamship, the Court, per
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, ruled that a back pay award was beyond
the Board's authority because it would conflict with the policies reflected in
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).3 9 According to
Rehnquist, "[s]ince Southern S.S. Co., we have... never deferred to the
Board's remedial preferences where such preferences potentially trench
upon federal statues and policies unrelated to the NLRA."3 t Like the Court
in Southern Steamship, Rehnquist ignored the fact that neither the IRCA
nor labor law spoke in any way to the propriety of back pay in such a
situation. For him, the decisive concern, which is as speculative as Byrnes'
concerns about mutiny, was that such a remedy would "encourage the
successful evasion" of the immigration laws, which criminalize illegal
employment on the part of both the employee and the employer; awarding
back pay would "subvert" the immigration laws.3 1'
Writing for four dissenters, Justice Stephen Breyer raised a number of
trenchant counter-arguments. He contended, quite plausibly and in line
with the position of "all the relevant agencies," that the Board's resort to
back pay in this case, which was narrowly tailored to avoid creating an
NLRB, 321 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Davis-Bacon Act); Nat'l Mar. Union v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp.
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (national policy regarding the Panama Canal).
307. In a few cases, courts have found appeals to Southern Steamship inadequate to limit the
Board's remedial powers. See Atl. Limousine, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 711, 715-17 (3d Cir. 2001);
NLRB v. Lee Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1347 (9th Cir. 1994) (in both cases, tax policy does not prohibit
inclusion of unreported tips in back pay awards).
308. Hoffman Plastic was anticipated to some degree by Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB. Sure-Tan
involved an employer who reported undocumented workers to an immigration official in retaliation for
their support of the union, which caused them to leave the country. The issue for the Court was whether
the Board's remedies for such clear violations of § 8(a)(3), as modified by the Seventh Circuit, were
legal. In particular, the Seventh Circuit had ordered that in order to effectuate the aims of the labor law
in the case of such workers, the workers should be allowed four years in which to claim reinstatement
and six months of back pay. While a majority of the Court endorsed the Board and the Seventh Circuit's
position that undocumented workers are properly considered employees under the labor law, it also
invoked Southern Steamship to reject the remedies as modified. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883
(1984).
309. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
310. Id. at 144.
311. Id. at 149-51. In spite of the favorable implications of a "last in time" argument for
Rehnquist's position in Hoffman Plastics, he still invokes Southern Steamship's more expansive, anti-
labor law logic tojustify the decision.
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incentive to violate the law, would actually deter violations of both the
labor law and the immigration laws.312  Moreover, Breyer, unlike
Rehnquist, drew on the legislative history of the IRCA, which suggests no
Congressional intent to limit the Board's remedial power relative to
undocumented workers.3 3 Finally, Breyer persuasively distinguished both
Southern Steamship and Fansteel-on which Rehnquist relied somewhat
more generally-from the case at hand. While those earlier cases
concerned the power of the Board to remedy discharges occasioned by the
employees' own "unlawful acts," the discharge of the undocumented
employee in this case was motivated by his exercise of a right
unquestionably protected by the law.314
The point in reviewing Hoffman Plastic is not to critique the Court's
rulings in that case-a task that others have already accomplished.3 5
Rather, Hoffman Plastic is worth mentioning for the way it illustrates
Southern Steamship's enduring significance in undermining the Board's
remedial power, and with this undermining the protections that the labor
law offers to workers. In Hoffman Plastic as in Southern Steamship the
Court showed no interest in an equitable or rational balancing of the
respective statutes and policies. And it was certainly not concerned in
either case-or for that matter in a number of other cases that follow this
logic-to prefer the labor law and its policies over that of the ostensibly
conflicting statute. Inasmuch as this reasoning informed Hoffman Plastic,
and Hoffman Plastic is widely thought to effectively deny the protections of
the labor law to the millions of undocumented aliens who work in this




Southern Steamship left no doubt that seamen would remain wards of a
paternalistic regime of shipboard labor relations. It left no doubt either that
312. Id. at 153-56 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
313. Id. at 156-57.
314. Id. at 158-59.
315. See, e.g., Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the Supreme
Court Eroded Labor Law and Workers'Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. 313
(2003); Christopher Brackman, Hoffman v. NLRB, Creating More Harm Than Good: Why the Supreme
Court Should Not Have Denied Illegal Workers a Backpay Remedy Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 71 U. Mo.-Ks. CITY L.REv. 717 (2003); Gabriela Robin, Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Board: A Step Backwards for All Workers in the United States, 9 NEW ENG. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 679 (2003); Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving
Undocumented Workers Unprotected Under United States Labor Law?, 6 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 119
(2003).
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a conventional regime of private property and contract would survive the
Wagner Act and the challenge put forth by radical and militant elements of
New Deal labor. Strikes at the point of production, which had proven so
effective in the mid and late 1930s at revitalizing the labor movement and
giving real meaning to the labor law, would no longer be tolerated,
regardless of whether they were non-violent or justified by employer unfair
labor practices. Indeed, the case made clear that at least in instances of
unlawful conduct, even an appreciable risk of social disorder, however,
speculatively grounded, would substantially limit the right to strike and the
overall protections of the labor law. For all these reasons Southern
Steamship should be seen as one of the clearest expressions of the Court's
refusal to allow of any truly reformist agenda of workplace democracy-or,
as it was so often expressed in the 1930s, industrial freedom-to follow
from the Wagner Act.
Of course many will be tempted to defend the Court in Southern
Steamship, either its narrow holding or its broad implications. It may be
tempting, for example, to underscore the incompatibility of the shipboard
strike or some analogous kind of labor protest with a proper, peaceful
regime of labor relations. One might wonder what of the rights to capital
and property would survive the normalization of such strikes. It may be
tempting as well to recoil at the substantial industrial disorder implicit in
such labor protests. But like Byrnes' analysis of mutiny law, such concerns
beg the most critical questions: What is a proper regime of labor law? And
what is the value of traditional notions of private property and contract, or
of industrial peace, against the right to effective union representation and
the right to a more equitable distribution of power and control in the
workplace? These were precisely the questions exposed by the passage of
the Wagner Act and the upsurge in labor activism that both inspired and
accompanied this legislation. There are no obvious, purely legal answers to
these questions. To suppose that there are, as the Court does, reveals more
in the way of formalist, authoritarian, and fundamentally capitalist ideology
than it does any kind of airtight legal analysis.
As noted at the outset, this Article does not mean to suggest that
Southern Steamship alone, or even primarily, accounted for the long decline
of the American labor movement. To suggest as much would not only rest
on an impractical logic; it would also far overstate the significance of the
law in general and the courts in particular to the evolution of social
structures. At the same time, though, it does seem likely that Southern
Steamship both symbolized and abetted the decline of militancy and
radicalism in the American labor movement. Of course, the exact effect of
Southern Steamship on the course of labor relations must remain a matter of
speculation. It is clear, though, that there were very few shipboard strikes
after the decision came down-and few point of production strikes in other
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contexts either. Indeed, in a few documented instances, the threat of mutiny
was used to ward off planned shipboard protests.316 As with Fansteel,
Mackay Radio, or for that matter the Taft-Hartley Act, labor largely
accommodated itself to the new rule of law once the rule was established.
In the case of Southern Steamship and the NMU, this accommodation was
surely abetted by the Second World War and the NMU's consolidation of
its position. But it is only reasonable to assume that the Court's decision-
which not only left all point of production strikes unprotected by the labor
law, but also opened the door to actual criminal mutiny prosecutions for
shipboard strikes--did much to deter these kinds of militant protests. And
with militancy goes the practical essence of labor radicalism, its foil and its
source of legitimacy.
Just as Southern Steamship represented the Court's rejection of
militant, radical labor, so too does the fate of the NMU capture the
institutional decline of leftist unionism. Having initially won over such a
huge membership in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the union soon found
itself struggling to fend off resurgent successors to the ISU, which among
other things resorted to red and race baiting to pry away members."1 The
war then claimed the lives of hundreds of members; casualty rates were
higher for seamen in the first part of 1943 than for all American services
combined.31 Yet it also marked the NMU's most glorious period.
Merchant seamen in general were acclaimed as heroes. And icons of the
American left such as Woody Guthrie (who was also an active member and
survived two sinkings) and Studs Turkel lent their assistance to the NMU's
organizing effort, helping to push membership to near 100,000. 319 During
this time, too, the NMU continued to show its commitment to radical and
progressive causes. In addition to continuing to break down barriers
erected by its predecessor to black shipboard service, the NMU was also,
for example, one of the major institutional contributors to a fund to solve
the last mass lynching in America.32°
The post-war years, which resulted in an inevitable glut in shipping,
321
316. Tugboat Union Set to Strike Monday as Parlays Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1946, at 1; 'Mutiny'
is Mediated: Freighter Sails After Delay Over Defective Fans, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1957, at 36.
317. See, e.g., Don Willett, Another Lost Cause? Maritime Labor Unity on the Gulf Coast
Waterfronts, 43 LA. HIST. 315, 317-29 (2002) (describing the emergence of jurisdictional and
ideological rivalries between the NMU and the ISU's successor, the Seafarers International Union, in
Gulf Coast ports).
318. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 212.
319. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 225; on Woody Guthrie's involvement with the NMU as
member and organizer, see JOE KLEIN, WOODY GUTHRIE: A LIFE 276-77, 290-91 (1999); on Studs
Turkel's role as organizer, see STUDS TURKEL, WILL THE CIRCLE BE UNBROKEN 92 (1992).
320. LAURA WEXLER, FIRE IN THE CANEBRAKE: THE LAST MAJOR LYNCHING IN AMERICA 127
(2003).
321. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 220-22.
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brought renewed economic conflict, including a number of large scale
strikes.2 Of more lasting consequence, this period was also marked by a
tragic purge of communist members-tragic not least because these were
the men who had done so much to build the union as a vibrant, progressive
organization in the first place. Although eventually mandated by provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act, the purge was initiated by Curran himself, who
likely saw the handwriting on the wall. 323 This would unfold amidst a
broader, more complicated movement away from radicalism within the
maritime labor movement.3 24 In any case, as a former NMU member would
accurately surmise in a letter to the New York Times some forty years later,
this development permanently deprived the union of its radical impulses
and, one might say, its ideological soul.
325
By the early 1960s, the NMU began to feel the effects of runaway
shops as American ship owners registered their vessels in foreign
jurisdictions. Shorn of its radicalism but not yet all of its militant
tendencies-at least not on an issue as critical as this-the union joined
other seafarers in a messy strike in the summer of 1961 to protest these
changes.326 The strike featured charges of desertion rather than mutiny; and
it did garner the union some concessions.32 7 But obviously such protest did
322. The NMU's post-war strikes were part of a broader surge of union militancy in this period,
focused on but not limited to CIO unions. The most notable strike, which occurred in the summer of
1946 after weeks of anticipation, lasted a very short time. Ship Unions Vote Quick End to Strike in Most
U.S. Ports, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1946, at 1. See also Crews Quit Ships in Drive to Halt Traffic on
Lakes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1946, at 1; NMU Group Backs New Ship Tie-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1946, at 63. Among the issues over which the NMU struck after the war was the speedy repatriation of
troops. NMU Protest Goes On as 1-Day Strike Ends, Dec. 5, 1945, at 20.
323. See, e.g., 3 Officials of NMU Held Communists: Party Interests Placed Above Those of
Maritime Union, Curran Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1947, at 10; Arthur Richter, Curran Charges
Communists Undermine Maritime Union, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1947, at 1. The NMU did file suit
challenging the constitutionality of the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act that required unions to file
affidavits demonstrating that none of its officers were in any way affiliated with the Communist Party.
This litigation was not successful. Nat'l Mar. Union of Am. v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. Cir.
1948), afj'd, 334 U.S. 854 (1948) (per curiam).
324. This period was marked by the demise of Committee on Maritime Unity, an attempt, led by
leftist leader of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union Harry Bridges, to coordinate
maritime labor. GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 257-61.
325. George Schwartz, Letter to the Editor, What Happened to American Seamen, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1987, at 26.
326. See, e.g., Seamen Walk Out, Tying Up Shipping on Three Coasts, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1961,
at 22; Unions and Principal Issues in the Maritime Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1961, at 19. The strike
was stayed by President John Kennedy, who invoked the national emergency provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Texts of Presidential Decrees in Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1961, at 16.
327. Amidst chaotic and bitter attempts at settlement and numerous court injunctions, several NMU
represented crews were charged with mass desertion and contempt of court for walking away from their
ships. N.M.U. Is Accused in 2 Strike Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1961, at 46; Issues Unsettled in
Desertion Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 11, 1961, at 44; Desertion Funds of Court Double, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1961, at 40. These charges were eventually dismissed. Court Dismisses Desertion Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1961, at 58.
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little to arrest this process in the longer term. Another notable strike in
1970, which was aimed at the sale of ships to foreign owners, met with
similarly ambiguous results. 328 By the 1970s the NMU represented a
number of shoreside industrial workers as well as seamen. In fact, in New
York, it even came to represent some stockbrokers.32 9 This expansion
eventually included successful-and ultimately shameful-raiding in the
meatpacking industry, which consistently presented workers with less
effective, more concessionary representation. 330 Through all of this, the
NMU showed how completely and quickly after the Second World War it
had traded its radicalism for a conventional "bread-and-butter" agenda. In
fact, the union's political affiliations moved decidedly to the right of center.
The fall of 1973 saw the union that had once so mightily championed the
Soviet cause in the Second World War boycotting Soviet ships to protest
that country's support for Arab states.33' Perhaps even more tellingly, this
union, which had stood well to the left of Franklin Roosevelt, endorsed
Ronald Reagan for president.332
Today, there are only about 30,000 seafarers of all ranks and types in
the American labor force. Far fewer still are the deep water sailors of the
kind who served on the City of Fort Worth and formed the mainstay of the
NMU's membership.333 But while there are few jobs for American seamen,
the hardships that so affected them through the 1930s, have not
disappeared. They have simply followed the ship's registries, or "flags," to
workers from the developing world. Like their American predecessors of
seventy or more years ago, these largely Chinese and Filipino "crews of
convenience" working on "flag of convenience" vessels, have not yet
achieved meaningful union representation. The law's protections, whether
of the flag state or international, mean little for them. Neither do they enjoy
the protections of American labor law; as forty years ago the Supreme
328. Word of Ship's Sale Spurs 5 Walkouts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1970, at 1.
329. Stock Brokers' Group Says it Affiliated with Maritime Union, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1970, at
11.
330. Some readers may in fact be familiar with the NMU only though a most unflattering mention
of its "representation" of Midwest meat packers in the early 1980s which appears in Erich Schlosser's
recent and very popular expose, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL
157-58 (2002). See also JEREMY RIFKIN, BEYOND BEEF: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CATTLE CULTURE
126-27 (1993).
331. Philip Shabecoff, Ship Unions Plan Boycott of Soviet to Halt Traders Until Aid to Arabs is
Stopped, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1973, at 31.
332. The union's endorsement of Reagan was the result of a rank-and-file rebellion. Maritime
Union Backs Reagan, Defying Leaders, WALL ST. J., Oct 10, 1980, at 12. See also Frank Lynn, Many
Unions in State Expected to Support Nixon, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1972, at 18.
333. There remain only 6,000 to 9,000 seafaring jobs on oceangoing vessels in the United States.
See, e.g., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl.1073, p.690 (Bureau of Census 2003);
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: WATER TRANSPORTATION OCCUPATIONS 582-83 (Dept. of
Labor 2003). The state of the American Merchant Marine in this season of decline is tellingly and
entertainingly described by popular writer JOHN MCPHEE in his LOOKING FOR A SHIP (1990).
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Court, in another blow to the NMU organizing efforts, ruled that labor law
did not apply to flag of convenience crews, even where the ship was
American owned.334  These crews of convenience serve for little pay on
unsafe vessels under arduous, often brutal conditions that sometimes
approach outright slavery.335
For his part, Curran became, like Furuseth, virtual president for life of
the NMU. He retired from the union in 1973 after thirty-six years as
president amidst a rather significant controversy over the hefty size of his
compensation package. Curran, the humble boswain's mate once widely
accused of being a communist, owned two homes and a yacht and earned
over $85,000 a year when he retired (more than any union leader at the time
except for James Hoffa Sr.); he traveled in a custom limousine and stood to
receive another million in pension benefits.336 Sadly, the flap over Curran's
compensation was not the only indication of corruption and self-dealing in
a union that emerged out a rank-and-file rebellion against many of these
very things. In 1973, a candidate for the union's presidency who had been
shot credibly ascribed this to an attempt to run him out of the race.337 In
1975, a New Jersey grand jury investigated the NMU leadership on
allegations of kickbacks, payoffs, and tax evasion.
338
Curran died in August, 1981, aged 75. The union he helped found has
survived him, but not very well. In 1988 the NMU, moribund, wracked by
scandals, and unable to deal with the massive loss of jobs through foreign
flagging, "merged" with the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association. But
amidst continuing charges of corruption, this agreement was dissolved only
four years later.339 For the next several years, the NMU seemed headed for
oblivion. Membership fell to only 2,000, and in 1997 its president, Louis
Parise, was convicted in federal court of several charges of racketeering and
334. The NMU had tried to organize crews of Honduran registered vessels wholly owned by an
American corporation. But the Court ruled that absent some clear congressional mandate, it could not
validate Board jurisdiction. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963).
335. See, e.g., SHIPS, SLAVES AND COMPETITION 37-68 (2000); PAUL K. CHAPMAN, TROUBLE ON
BOARD: THE PLIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL SEAFARERS (1992).
336. Werner Bamberger, Curran Retires as N.M.U. Head; Aide is Named Acting President, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1973, at 82; Damon Stetson, N.M.U. Pension Trustees Vote $4,464.77 Monthly for
Curran, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1973, at 62. Curran was ordered by a federal judge to repay much of this
package. Arnold H. Lubasch, Judge Tells Curran to Repay Funds to Maritime Union, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 1979, at 20. But eventually this was largely restored. Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1981).
337. Damon Stetson, Shot N.M.U. Candidate Tells of Getting Threat, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1973, at
20.
338. M.A. Farber, Charges of N.M.U. Graft Investigated by U.S. Jury, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1975, at
1. These troubles had been brewing for a while. John D. Williams, Storm in the NMU: Joseph Curran
Retains Presidency of Union, But His Woes Mount, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1969, at 1.
339. Albert R. Karr, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1992, at Al; Ann Hagedom, U.S.
Investigating Corruption by Big Seafaring Union, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1989, at 1.
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embezzlement.340 Salvation, of a sort, arrived in 1998, when the NMU
entered an arrangement with the Seafarers International Union which would
culminate, three years later, in a complete merger.341 Even more than the
earlier merger with the Marine Engineers, this was no merger of equals, as
the NMU's few thousand members joined ranks with nearly 80,000
Seafarers International members. There is more than a little irony, too, in
the NMU joining in this one-sided way with the successor to the very
union, the ISU, out of which it had so boldly emerged over sixty years
earlier. All the same, for members and for union pensioners, the merger
was no doubt an act of salvation. And the NMU name lives on.1
4
1
Would things have gone differently for the NMU had Southern
Steamship merely been decided differently? It is easy to say they would not
have, given all the other adverse forces at play. But it is certainly useful to
wonder whether the normalization of militant, point of production labor
protest, which a different outcome in Southern Steamship would have
entailed, would have offered the NMU and other unions much more
effective ways to fight runaway shops, to sympathize in meaningful ways
with other strikers, perhaps most importantly to assert a limited right of
property in their jobs and right of control over their workplaces. And while
militancy does not necessarily equal radicalism, it is surely easier for a
union to embrace radicalism when it is able to involve its members in a
project greater than their own immediate interests and to assert rights that
are, if not sufficient to a radical agenda, essential to it all the same.
340. Tim Shorrock, Parise Steps Down After Conviction, J. OF COMMERCE, Jan. 30, 1997, at 1A.
341. Maritime Unions Merge, J. OF COMMERCE, June 5, 2001, at WP; Tim Sandsbury, NMU,
Seafarers Sign Cooperative Agreement, J. OF COMMERCE, Dec. 17, 1998, at I 0A.
342. As an affiliate of the Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, the NMU is
now referred to as the Seafarers International Union of North America-Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes & Inland
Waterways District/NMU. See http://www.seafarers.org/about/affiliates.xml.
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